United States v. Bradd Quigley, 943 F.3d 390

Defendant Bradd Quigley pleaded guilty to methamphetamine conspiracy (21 U.S.C. § 841/846) and a § 924(c) firearms offense; PSR recommended career-offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on two prior felonies.
One predicate was an Iowa conviction for assault with intent to inflict serious injury (Iowa Code § 708.2(1)); the career-offender designation materially increased his Guidelines range.
Quigley challenged only the district court’s conclusion that the Iowa assault conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” for the career-offender enhancement.
The district court held Quigley was a career offender, imposed a Guidelines range then varied downward; Quigley appealed the career-offender classification.
The Eighth Circuit analyzed whether § 708.2(1) is divisible (categorical v. modified categorical) and whether the statute necessarily includes a physical-force element; it concluded the statute is indivisible and that the conviction qualifies under the Guidelines’ force clause.
The court affirmed, finding no realistic, non-theoretical way to violate § 708.2(1) without at least threatened use of physical force.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Iowa assault with intent to inflict serious injury (§ 708.2(1)) is divisible (categorical v. modified categorical)	Quigley argued the statute should be treated as divisible because it incorporates alternative definitions from other sections	Government argued the statute functions as a single, indivisible offense with alternative means to satisfy elements	Court held § 708.2(1) is indivisible; apply the categorical approach
Whether § 708.2(1) necessarily includes a physical-force element such that it is a "crime of violence" under the force clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)	Quigley argued the statute can be applied in a non-forceful way and therefore is not a crime of violence	Government argued conviction necessarily requires use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force	Court held conviction necessarily involves use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force and thus qualifies under the force clause

United States v. Boose, 739 F.3d 1185 (8th Cir. 2014) (review of career-offender classification is de novo)
United States v. Ossana, 638 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 2011) (step one: decide categorical or modified categorical approach)
United States v. Schneider, 905 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2018) (distinguishing indivisible statutes from divisible ones for categorical analysis)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (statutory alternatives may be elements or merely means; governs divisibility analysis)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" defined as force capable of causing pain or injury)
United States v. Gaines, 895 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2018) (applying force-clause analysis to Iowa assault-with-intent offense)
Fletcher v. United States, 858 F.3d 501 (8th Cir. 2017) (defendant must point to actual state-court applications to show a realistic non-force application)
State v. Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d 174 (Iowa 2017) (Iowa Supreme Court required threatened or actual force to establish intent-to-inflict-serious-injury element)