United States v. Bowman
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21837
8th Cir.2011Background
- Bowman was arrested March 10, 2010 after a routine traffic stop yielded nearly 3,000 grams of cocaine and he was charged with possession with intent to distribute.
- Bowman moved to suppress the cocaine on May 5, 2010; the magistrate judge recommended denial, the district court overruled the objection, and Bowman did not appear for trial.
- Bowman entered a conditional guilty plea to the cocaine charge and an unconditional plea to failure to appear, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling; he was sentenced to 120 months and 30 months consecutive.
- During the stop, a Iowa State Patrol Trooper observed a dark-tinted, Utah-registered BMW on I-80 traveling 71 mph and pulled it over.
- The dashboard video showed a ‘lived-in’ interior, three visible cell phones, nervous behavior from Bowman and Flores, and a window tint of 28% (Iowa requires 70%).
- After 14 1/2 minutes, the Trooper had Bowman join him in the car, conducted further questioning, and obtained consent for a canine sniff, which alerted to narcotics; cocaine was found after a dog sniff and additional search.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the stop was unconstitutionally prolonged | Bowman argues the 14-minute stop exceeded the time needed to issue warnings. | Bowman contends routine stop tasks can take longer when complications arise, and suspicion grows over time. | Stop was reasonable; prolonged only as allowed by routine tasks and growing suspicion. |
| Whether Bowman was seized after warning tickets | Bowman claims he was detained and not free to leave after tickets. | Officer-vehicle interaction remained cooperative and consensual. | There was no seizure after tickets; interaction remained consensual. |
| Whether the Trooper had reasonable suspicion | Bowman contends lack of articulable facts supporting seizure. | Multiple observations (tint, nervousness, inconsistent stories, 'lived-in' car, criminal history) supported suspicion. | There was reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop. |
| Whether consent to dog sniff was voluntary | Bowman claims coercion or intimidation to obtain consent. | Trooper was congenial; Bowman stated the dog sniff would be 'cool'; no coercion shown. | Consent to dog sniff was voluntary. |
| Whether dog sniff provided probable cause for the search | Jake the dog’s reliability was questionable due to potential residual odors. | Jake trained and certified, with no significant history of false alerts; alert established probable cause. | Probable cause existed based on a reliable dog alert. |
Key Cases Cited
- Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (U.S. 2005) (no per se time limit for traffic stops when reasonable)
- United States v. Sanchez, 417 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2005) (routine stop tasks may extend detention)
- United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 2008) (blended drug-interdiction inquiry can prolong a stop)
- United States v. Suitt, 569 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (suspicion may grow over course of stop justifying further questioning)
- United States v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (U.S. 2000) (minimal objective justification required for a stop)
- United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2007) (probable cause from dog-sniff alert standing alone)
- United States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 1999) (dog-sniff alerts can establish probable cause)
- United States v. Ameling, 328 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 2003) (probable cause to search vehicle without warrant)
- United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (U.S. 1980) (framework for determining if a person is seized)