United States v. Bohannon
824 F.3d 242
2d Cir.2016Background
- Early morning, Dec. 5, 2013: FBI had an arrest warrant for Jonathan Bohannon and planned to arrest him at his residence (103 Crestview Dr.) but surveillance showed no sign he was home.
- Cell‑site data (Verizon) showed Bohannon’s phone last active at 2:38 a.m. in a sector not covering his home; that sector included 34 Morgan Ave., the apartment of Shonsai Dickson.
- Investigators had additional links between Bohannon and 34 Morgan Ave.: intercepted texts referencing Morgan Avenue, past GPS placements near that address, one prior observation of Bohannon at the building entrance, and sightings of Dickson’s car near Bohannon’s home and at Morgan Ave.
- Agents, holding only Bohannon’s arrest warrant (no search warrant for Dickson’s apartment), entered an unlocked back door at 34 Morgan Ave., found and arrested Bohannon in Dickson’s bedroom, and observed drugs under the bed; Bohannon’s pants yielded cash.
- After advising Dickson, agents obtained her consent to search; additional drugs, cash, and firearms were seized. District court suppressed evidence seized incident to arrest, finding officers lacked Payton’s “reason to believe” Bohannon was present; government appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (U.S.) | Defendant's Argument (Bohannon) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a subject arrested in a third‑party home may invoke Steagald to require a search warrant for entry | Steagald protects third‑party residents only; Payton governs an arrestee’s rights whether in own home or as guest | Steagald should apply to any warrant‑subject who is a visitor in a third‑party home | Held: Payton governs the arrestee’s rights; Steagald protects only the third‑party resident, not the arrest‑warrant subject |
| Standard required under Payton: is “reason to believe” equivalent to probable cause? | Government: in this circuit, Lauter controls and reason to believe is less than probable cause | Bohannon: accepts Lauter but argues facts here do not meet even that lesser standard | Held: Reason to believe requires more than a hunch but less than probable cause (Lauter); totality of facts met that standard |
| Whether officers had reason to believe Bohannon was in Dickson’s apartment at entry | Government: combined cell‑site data, surveillance, text intercepts, past GPS/observations, and car sightings gave articulable basis | Bohannon: cell‑site data and isolated facts are too imprecise to support presence at that specific apartment | Held: Totality of circumstances provided articulable, objective reason to believe Bohannon might be inside; arrest and search incident to arrest lawful |
| Whether evidence seized incident to arrest must be suppressed as fruit of unlawful entry | Government: no suppression if Payton satisfied; search‑incident‑to‑arrest and protective sweep doctrines apply | Bohannon: suppression required because entry lacked search‑warrant authorization under Steagald or lacked reason to believe he was present under Payton | Held: Suppression reversed as to evidence incident to arrest; remanded for district court to address other suppression rulings (consent issues, vehicle, etc.) |
Key Cases Cited
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1979) (arrest warrant implicitly authorizes entry into suspect’s dwelling when there is reason to believe the suspect is inside)
- Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (third‑party resident’s Fourth Amendment interest requires a search warrant to authorize entry to search for another person)
- Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (overnight guest has standing to challenge a warrantless entry)
- United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 1995) (in this circuit, Payton’s “reason to believe” is a standard less than probable cause)
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (Fourth Amendment rights are personal; standing depends on legitimate expectation of privacy)
- Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (probable cause and reasonable suspicion are commonsense, context‑dependent standards)