928 F.3d 349
4th Cir.2019Background
- In 2009 Bobby Arion Dinkins pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery and to being a felon in possession of a firearm; his sentence (252 months) included an ACCA enhancement based in part on three prior North Carolina convictions: common‑law robbery, accessory before the fact of armed robbery, and second‑degree burglary.
- The ACCA enhancement imposes a mandatory 15‑year minimum if a defendant has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses.
- After Johnson v. United States (2015) struck down the ACCA residual clause, Dinkins sought § 2255 relief arguing his North Carolina robbery and accessory convictions no longer qualified as ACCA predicate violent felonies.
- The district court dismissed his § 2255 motion; Dinkins appealed and this Court granted a certificate of appealability to decide whether his prior convictions remain ACCA predicates under the force clause.
- The Fourth Circuit applied the categorical approach and Supreme Court guidance from Stokeling to reassess whether North Carolina common‑law robbery and accessory‑before‑the‑fact of armed robbery qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA force clause.
Issues
| Issue | Dinkins' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether NC common‑law robbery is a violent felony under ACCA force clause | NC robbery can be committed with de minimis contact and thus does not require "violent force" | Stokeling abrogates Gardner; NC robbery requires force to overcome resistance and matches common‑law robbery | NC common‑law robbery is a violent felony under the ACCA force clause (Stokeling governs) |
| Whether NC accessory before the fact of armed robbery is a violent felony | Inchoate accessory elements are distinct; defendant need not personally use force | NC accessory incorporates the elements of the underlying armed robbery; accessory treated as principal for punishment | Accessory before the fact of armed robbery is a violent felony because it incorporates armed robbery elements |
| Whether ACCA force clause requires the defendant personally to have used force | Defendant says force must be personally used by him | Government says elements of the offense, not defendant's personal conduct, suffice | No personal‑use requirement; elements of the offense control |
| Whether Gardner remains binding after Stokeling | Gardner held NC robbery not an ACCA predicate; Dinkins relies on Gardner | Stokeling changes the test for "violent force," rendering Gardner unpersuasive | Gardner is abrogated by Stokeling as applied to NC robbery |
Key Cases Cited
- Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (ACCA’s "violent force" covers robbery that overcomes victim resistance)
- Gardner v. United States, 823 F.3d 793 (4th Cir. 2016) (prior Fourth Circuit holding that NC robbery did not satisfy ACCA force clause)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defining "physical force" as "violent force" capable of causing pain or injury)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach: sentencing courts look to statutory elements, not underlying facts)