United States v. Blodgett, 872 F.3d 66

In 1997 Douglas Blodgett was convicted in Maine for unlawful sexual contact with a 13‑year‑old; he had no further convictions for nearly two decades.
In 2016 DHS investigation revealed Blodgett had downloaded and viewed child pornography; he was charged in federal court with accessing child pornography with intent to view it (18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)).
Blodgett pleaded guilty and the PSR yielded a Guidelines range of 57–71 months.
The district court imposed a statutory ten‑year mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) (applicable because of his prior state conviction involving abusive sexual conduct with a minor) and sentenced him to 10 years.
Blodgett appealed, arguing the ten‑year mandatory minimum violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause (as arbitrary) and the Eighth Amendment (as cruel and unusual/grossly disproportionate).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the ten‑year mandatory minimum in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) violates Due Process as arbitrary	Government: Congress had a rational basis—recidivism and combating the child‑pornography market justify the heightened mandatory minimum	Blodgett: The statute is arbitrary as applied — long lapse since prior offense; Congress targeted distributors/manufacturers, not mere viewers; he was entitled to individualized sentencing	Affirmed: statute survives rational‑basis review; legislative history and legitimate aims (punishing recidivism, reducing supply/demand) provide a rational basis; no due‑process violation
Whether the ten‑year mandatory minimum is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment	Government: the sentence is within congressional policy choices and not grossly disproportionate	Blodgett: Ten years is grossly disproportionate to his conduct as a viewer rather than a producer/distributor; treatment would be preferable	Affirmed: review for plain error fails; gross‑disproportionality standard not met; mandatory minimums are not "unusual" and courts defer to Congress's sentencing judgment

Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991) (due process and legislative sentencing classifications must be rationally related to legitimate interests)
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (rational‑basis framework discussed in substantive due process contexts)
United States v. Wheelock, 772 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2014) (applied rational‑basis review to § 2252(b)(1) mandatory minimum challenge)
United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding enhanced penalties for recidivist child‑sex offenders)
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality recognizing recidivism as legitimate basis for increased punishment)
United States v. Polk, 546 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2008) (Eighth Amendment gross‑disproportionality standard and deference to Congress on mandatory minimums)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality for noncapital sentences)
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (mandatory minimums are not "unusual" in the constitutional sense)
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (framework for comparing sentences across crimes and jurisdictions in Eighth Amendment analysis)
United States v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1991) (no constitutional right to wholly individualized sentences in noncapital cases)
United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2007) (deference to legislative sentencing choices under Eighth Amendment)