United States v. Black
918 F.3d 243
2d Cir.2019Background
- In March 2012 Black, Rodriguez, and Green were indicted on a Hobbs Act conspiracy; the government immediately signaled the case might be death-penalty eligible and learned counsel were appointed. After protracted pretrial litigation (missing photo arrays, evidentiary hearings, discovery disputes), the government filed a nine‑count superseding indictment in December 2014 adding murder- and firearms-related charges (and two defendants) and making some charges death‑eligible.
- The Department of Justice decision on whether to seek the death penalty took roughly 2 years 10 months; the government ultimately declined in January 2015. From indictment to trial the defendants waited ~68 months (March 2012–Oct 2017). Trial began Oct. 31, 2017; jury acquitted on some counts and hung on others.
- Defendants moved to dismiss the superseding indictment on Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial grounds; the district court granted dismissal of Counts 1–5 (Harper murder-related counts). The government appealed; the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal.
- The court applied the Barker v. Wingo four‑factor balancing test (length of delay; reason for delay; assertion of right; prejudice) and found the delay presumptively prejudicial, much delay chargeable to the government (death‑penalty indecision, lost evidence, late superseding indictment, failures to produce witnesses/defendants), and repeated assertions of the speedy‑trial right by defendants.
- The panel rejected a dissenting view that the speedy‑trial clock for charges in a superseding indictment should start when those charges are filed (a Blockburger‑style, offense‑by‑offense trigger). It held the relevant interval runs from the first indictment/arrest to trial when the later charges arise from the same conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated by ~68 months delay from initial indictment/arrest to trial | Defendants: delay was presumptively prejudicial, government caused significant neutral delay (death‑penalty indecision, missing evidence, late superseding indictment, failures to produce), defendants repeatedly asserted right, and prejudice (anxiety; oppressive pretrial incarceration; impaired defense options) warrants dismissal | Government: litigative and institutional delays, some defendant-requested extensions, and any delay after superseding indictment should be measured from that indictment (not from the original indictment/arrest) | Held: Violation. Delay presumptively prejudicial; substantial delay attributable to government; defendants asserted their rights; prejudice shown (particularly anxiety over capital prosecution). Dismissal of Counts 1–5 affirmed. |
| When does the Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial clock start for charges added in a superseding indictment that arise from the same conduct? | Defendants: measure from initial indictment/arrest because liberty interests and anxiety attach from that time; superseding indictment that reasserts same‑conduct charges should not reset clock | Government: (argued below and in dissent) clock for new charges should run from the date those charges were filed (superseding indictment); Blockburger-style offense‑specific trigger applies | Held: Majority rejects Blockburger approach here. Speedy‑trial period runs from the first indictment/arrest to trial where the superseding counts arise from the same conduct; government forfeited alternative timing argument on appeal, and adopting Blockburger would undermine Sixth Amendment purposes. |
| Allocation of responsibility for delay (who bears burden) | Defendants: government mismanaged case (lost photo arrays, delayed death‑penalty decision, filed superseding indictment at statute‑of‑limitations eve), so government bears most delay | Government: much delay resulted from neutral institutional factors and some from defense extensions; no deliberate delay; any pre‑indictment investigative delay should be assessed under Due Process, not Sixth Amendment | Held: Majority attributes significant neutral and avoidable delay to government (death‑penalty indecision, missing evidence litigation, late superseding indictment, failure to produce witnesses/defendants); some delay charged to defendants but outweighed by government responsibility. |
| Role of prejudice and whether affirmative proof of defense impairment is required | Defendants: prejudice shown by lengthy incarceration and extreme anxiety over capital exposure even absent specific loss of evidence/witnesses | Government: no showing of specific defense impairment; time from filing of superseding indictment to trial mainly due to defense‑requested extensions | Held: Prejudice need not be proved in detail; prolonged delay and capital uncertainty presumptively prejudicial per Barker and Doggett; psychological and liberty interests weighed heavily for dismissal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (establishes four‑factor speedy trial balancing test)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (delay approaching one year may be presumptively prejudicial; excessive delay can presumptively impair reliability)
- Marion v. United States, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (speedy‑trial protections attach at the start of prosecution; arrest or indictment can trigger right)
- Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975) (speedy‑trial period includes time between arrest and indictment)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (two offenses are the same for double jeopardy only if each requires proof of an element the other does not)
- MacDonald v. United States, 456 U.S. 1 (1982) (period between arrest and indictment must be considered in speedy‑trial claims)
- Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016) (Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial right protects accused from arrest or indictment through trial)
- United States v. New Buffalo Amusement Corp., 600 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1979) (government bears affirmative obligation to bring cases to trial promptly)
- United States v. Tigano, 880 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 2018) (recent Second Circuit speedy‑trial reversal; contextualizes institutional delay concerns)
- United States v. Vispi, 545 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1976) (government’s duty to monitor cases and press for prompt trial)