United States v. Billy Thorne, 896 F.3d 861

Thorne, a convicted felon, acquired a firearm in 2012 and threatened to kill his son and his son’s girlfriend; he was convicted in federal court of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
On initial sentencing the court treated Thorne as an Armed Career Criminal and imposed 262 months; this was vacated on appeal after the government conceded Florida burglary convictions did not qualify as violent felonies.
At resentencing the PSR produced an offense level of 18 (including a § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement) and criminal-history category II, yielding an advisory range of 30–37 months and a statutory maximum of 120 months.
The government sought an upward variance to 120 months, arguing the Guidelines underrepresented Thorne’s criminal history, danger to the public, and recidivism risk.
Thorne argued for a within-Guidelines sentence, citing advanced age, health problems (diabetes, high blood pressure), longstanding mental-health and substance-abuse history, and post-incarceration programming.
The district court imposed a 120-month sentence after expressly considering § 3553(a) factors and finding Thorne posed a danger and a high risk of recidivism; the Eighth Circuit affirmed on appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Thorne)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether the 120‑month upward variance was substantively unreasonable	Court misweighed § 3553(a) factors; failed to give adequate weight to health, mental‑health, drug history, and post‑incarceration rehabilitation	Variance justified because Guidelines underrepresent Thorne’s criminality, offense seriousness, deterrence needs, and public‑safety risk	Affirmed: within district court’s discretion; sentence substantively reasonable under abuse‑of‑discretion review
Whether the court impermissibly double‑counted factors already in the Guidelines (e.g., the § 2K2.1 enhancement)	The court relied on conduct and history already accounted for in the Guidelines, so large variance is disfavored	Court may consider factors in addition to Guidelines and weigh them differently when underrepresentation is shown	Affirmed: district court may rely on conduct/criminal history even if partly considered by Guidelines; Martinez and McMannus do not mandate reversal

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard for substantive reasonableness and guidance on variances)
United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (discussing substantive‑reasonableness review and deference to district courts)
United States v. Martinez, 821 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2016) (warning against substantial variances that effectively recharacterize a defendant’s status based on conduct already reflected in Guidelines)
United States v. McMannus, 436 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2006) (pre‑Gall discussion of variances; later distinguished post‑Gall)
United States v. David, 682 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2012) (recognizing courts may rely on factors already considered by Guidelines when justifying a variance)
United States v. Ruelas‑Mendez, 556 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 2009) (district court has considerable discretion in weighing § 3553(a) factors)