863 F.3d 679
7th Cir.2017Background
- Bennett pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, a § 922(g)(1) offense; plea agreement stipulated a 180-month sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).
- ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum for defendants with three or more prior "violent felony" convictions, defined in part as crimes having as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another.
- One of Bennett’s predicate convictions was under Indiana’s resisting law enforcement statute, Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3 (subsections (a) and (b)); subsection (a) describes misdemeanor resisting conduct; subsection (b) elevates punishment when bodily injury, deadly weapon use, or vehicle conduct occurs.
- The district court treated Bennett’s prior conviction (for causing or inflicting bodily injury while resisting) as a violent felony and imposed the 180-month ACCA sentence.
- The Seventh Circuit examined whether the Indiana offense necessarily has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force (the ACCA elements test) and whether Bennett’s plea and resulting sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for his admitted crime.
- The court concluded the Indiana definition of "inflicting bodily injury" can encompass nonviolent, incidental injury (citing Whaley), so the conviction did not qualify as a violent felony; because Bennett’s admitted offense carried a 120-month statutory maximum, the 180-month stipulated sentence exceeded the maximum and required vacating the plea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bennett’s Indiana resisting conviction qualifies as an ACCA "violent felony" (element must be use/attempted/threatened physical force) | Government: subsection (b) enhancements (e.g., causing bodily injury) make the conviction a violent felony | Bennett: Indiana’s "inflict or cause bodily injury" can be satisfied by nonviolent conduct and thus is not categorically a violent felony | The conviction is not a violent felony because Indiana law allows conviction based on nonviolent, incidental injury; government failed to prove categorical force element |
| Whether multiple alternatives in subsection (b)(1)(B) create distinct offenses under Mathis | Government: subsection (b)(1)(B) lists separate elements creating distinct offenses | Bennett: even if alternatives were distinct, his specific conviction still does not require violent force | Court: even accepting the government’s parse, Bennett’s offense is nonviolent, so ACCA does not apply |
| Whether the 180-month plea sentence was lawful given Bennett’s admitted offense | Government: plea stipulated 180 months under ACCA | Bennett: statutory maximum for his admitted § 922(g)(1) offense (without ACCA) is 120 months; plea sentence thus exceeded maximum | Court: 180 months exceeded statutory maximum (120 months); plea must be vacated |
| Remedy for sentencing error | Government: enforce plea stipulation | Bennett: vacate plea and remand | Court: reversed district judgment, vacated plea, remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450 (7th Cir.) (discussing appeal waiver enforcement)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (U.S. 2016) (distinction between alternative-elements statutes and alternative-means statutes)
- United States v. Gibson, 356 F.3d 761 (7th Cir.) (plea exceeding statutory maximum requires vacatur)
- Whaley v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (Indiana court construing "inflict bodily injury" to include incidental injuries from resisting)