United States v. Benjamin Carter
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 8142
| 4th Cir. | 2014Background
- Benjamin Carter, an admitted long-term marijuana user, was found in his apartment with marijuana, drug paraphernalia, cash, and two firearms; he disclosed purchasing the guns for protection.
- Charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) for possession of firearms as an unlawful user/addict of a controlled substance, Carter pleaded guilty conditionally to preserve his Second Amendment challenge.
- On initial appeal (Carter I), the Fourth Circuit assumed the Second Amendment was implicated but applied intermediate scrutiny because Carter was not a law-abiding citizen; it remanded for the government to produce evidence justifying the statute’s fit with the government’s interest.
- On remand the district court received empirical studies and other materials and concluded the government met its burden, finding a correlation between drug use (including marijuana) and violent criminality and invoking commonsense factors about drug-related risks.
- Carter appealed again, arguing the government still failed to justify § 922(g)(3), contending the court over-relied on non-empirical factors and that most studies addressed drug use generally rather than marijuana specifically or causation.
- The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that correlational empirical evidence together with commonsense and precedent sufficed under intermediate scrutiny to show a reasonable fit between § 922(g)(3) and the government’s interest in preventing gun violence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to Carter | Carter: statute infringes his right to bear arms; government failed to justify restriction—insufficient empirical proof, focused studies don’t show marijuana causes violence | Government: intermediate scrutiny applies; need only a reasonable fit supported by empirical and commonsense evidence showing drug users are more likely to be violent or risky with guns | Held: intermediate scrutiny; government satisfied burden—correlational studies + commonsense + precedent show reasonable fit; statute constitutional as applied |
| Whether district court erred by relying on non-empirical sources (e.g., common sense, legislative design, precedent) | Carter: court improperly relied on non-empirical factors beyond adversarial evidence | Government: statute may be justified by a range of sources; empirical evidence supplemented by legislative history and commonsense is permissible | Held: district court permissibly considered multiple sources; Carter I authorized such consideration |
| Whether studies were inadequate because they addressed drugs generally, not marijuana specifically | Carter: government evidence is overbroad; marijuana users not prone to violence per his studies | Government: some submitted studies specifically link marijuana use to increased likelihood of violent/criminal behavior; other studies show co-occurrence | Held: government presented studies showing an association between marijuana use and violence; Carter’s critiques do not undermine the reasonable fit |
| Whether correlational (non-causal) evidence is insufficient to justify § 922(g)(3) | Carter: lack of causal proof undermines statute’s fit | Government: Congress may rely on correlational evidence; intermediate scrutiny requires a reasonable, not perfect, fit | Held: correlational evidence is sufficient under intermediate scrutiny; causation not required |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizing an individual right to bear arms and framing core-right analysis)
- United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2012) (Carter I) (remanding for evidentiary development on fit between § 922(g)(3) and public-safety interest)
- United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) (endorsing intermediate scrutiny for certain Second Amendment challenges)
- United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2011) (upholding disarmament under correlational evidence; less-than-strict fit requirement)
- United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (intermediate-scrutiny standard: fit must be reasonable, not perfect)
- United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011) (confirming that least-restrictive-means is not required under intermediate scrutiny)
- United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding § 922(g)(3) and relying on commonsense about habitual drug users and risk)