United States v. Benito Sanchez-Rodriguez
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12628
| 5th Cir. | 2016Background
- Benito Sanchez-Rodriguez pleaded guilty in 2002 in Florida to "dealing in stolen property" (Fla. Stat. § 812.019) and was later deported; he illegally reentered and pleaded guilty in federal court to 8 U.S.C. § 1326 in 2015.
- The PSR applied an 8-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), treating the Florida conviction as an aggravated felony (theft offense with a term of imprisonment ≥ 1 year), producing a Guidelines range of 24–30 months.
- Sanchez-Rodriguez objected, arguing the Florida statute is broader than the generic federal definition of "theft offense" because it permits conviction on a "should have known" mental state rather than an intent to deprive.
- The district court overruled the objection and imposed a 27-month sentence; Sanchez-Rodriguez appealed.
- The Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo (objection preserved) and applied the categorical/modified categorical approach to determine whether the Florida offense matched the generic federal theft offense.
- The court concluded Florida's dealing-in-stolen-property statute is broader (does not require specific intent to deprive) and Florida courts treat it as a non–specific-intent crime; thus the conviction cannot categorically be an aggravated felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sanchez-Rodriguez's Florida conviction qualifies as an "aggravated felony" (theft offense) under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) | Govt: The Florida conviction qualifies because it involves trafficking in stolen goods and may reflect guilty knowledge sufficient to satisfy generic theft | Sanchez-Rodriguez: Fla. statute allows conviction on a "should have known" standard and lacks an intent-to-deprive element, so it is broader than the generic federal theft offense | Court: Held for Sanchez-Rodriguez — Florida statute is broader and may criminalize conduct outside the generic theft definition; conviction is not a categorical aggravated felony, so enhancement was improper |
| Whether the defendant preserved the objection to permit de novo review | Sanchez-Rodriguez: He timely objected in writing and at sentencing | Govt: Argued review should be plain error due to insufficient specificity | Court: Held for Sanchez-Rodriguez — objection was sufficiently specific; review is de novo |
| Whether Florida case law supports a realistic probability that the statute reaches conduct outside the generic theft offense | Sanchez-Rodriguez: Cited Florida decisions holding dealing in stolen property is not a specific-intent crime and can rest on "should have known" | Govt: Argued that guilty knowledge implies intent to deprive and cited cases where knowing guilt supported convictions | Court: Held for Sanchez-Rodriguez — Florida authority demonstrates the statute can be applied without the specific intent element, creating a realistic probability of overbreadth |
| Whether the sentencing error was harmless | Govt: Implicitly argued the sentence could stand or error was harmless | Sanchez-Rodriguez: The correct Guidelines range would be lower; sentence outside correct range is not harmless | Court: Held for Sanchez-Rodriguez — error was not harmless; remanded for resentencing under correct Guidelines range |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishes the categorical approach for prior convictions)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (limits use of sentencing facts and explains modified categorical approach for divisible statutes)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (defines the limited documents courts may consult under the modified categorical approach)
- Burke v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 695 (5th Cir.) (defines the generic meaning of "theft offense" for § 1101(a)(43)(G))
- Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (requires a realistic probability that a state statute reaches conduct outside the federal generic offense)
Outcome
The Fifth Circuit vacated the 27-month sentence and remanded for resentencing because the Florida conviction for dealing in stolen property is broader than the generic federal "theft offense" and therefore could not support the 8-level aggravated-felony enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).