United States v. Benitez Moody
931 F.3d 366
| 4th Cir. | 2019Background
- Police used a confidential informant in a narcotics investigation; on March 24, 2016 the informant arranged a controlled heroin purchase from Moody and two female associates; Moody allegedly arranged the sale by phone but was not physically present when the hand-to-hand transfer occurred.
- Detective Beth Shelkey prepared an affidavit supporting warrants to search Moody’s home (1212 Lindsay Ave) and vehicle; the affidavit stated that "MOODY and other co-conspirators (two unidentified black females) were observed leaving from 1212 Lindsay Ave ... and selling the Informant heroin."
- A magistrate issued warrants the same day; searches of the home and vehicle recovered firearms, drugs, paraphernalia, and cash; Moody was federally indicted on multiple drug and firearm charges.
- At trial the informant and Detective Shelkey both testified that Moody was not physically present at the point of sale but had directed the transaction remotely; the jury convicted Moody on several counts.
- After conviction, Moody moved for a Franks hearing, arguing Shelkey’s affidavit falsely stated he was present for the March 24 sale; the district court denied the motion for failing to make the required preliminary showing.
- On appeal the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding Moody failed to show (a) objective falsity in the affidavit (b) intentional or reckless misrepresentation by Shelkey, or (c) materiality of any alleged falsity to the probable-cause finding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Moody) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Moody was entitled to a Franks hearing challenging the warrant affidavit | Shelkey’s affidavit falsely stated Moody was physically present during the controlled buy on March 24; that falsehood was intentional or reckless and material to probable cause | Any infirmity was at most ambiguous or negligent; statements were true in substance (Moody directed the sale and runners left his house) and any misstatement was immaterial to probable cause | Denied — Moody failed to make the substantial preliminary showing required for a Franks hearing |
| Whether the affidavit’s statement that controlled purchases were conducted “directly from” the house was false or misleading | "Directly from" implies transfers occurred inside the house, which Moody says was not true | The phrase can mean sales arranged or dispatched from the house; even if false, no evidence of intent or materiality because probable cause did not hinge on exact transaction location | Denied — no showing of intentional/reckless falsity or materiality |
| Whether the affidavit overstated the number/role of informants or misrepresented informant observations inside the house | Affidavit misrepresented number of controlled buys and that an informant had been inside and seen paraphernalia | Trial testimony and other officers corroborated additional informants and at least one informant had been inside the house; Moody’s assertions were conclusory | Denied — Moody failed to provide nonconclusory evidence of falsity |
| Whether alleged omissions (informant not at address, Shelkey knew Moody wasn’t present, informant unreliable) required a Franks hearing | Shelkey omitted material facts that would have defeated probable cause | Omissions were either irrelevant or unsupported; Moody’s lack of presence was immaterial and informant reliability was not shown to be omitted | Denied — omissions standard not met; no showing of material omitted facts |
Key Cases Cited
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (establishes requirement and standards for a hearing to challenge affidavit veracity)
- United States v. White, 850 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2017) (describes Franks preliminary-showing elements and review standard)
- United States v. Tate, 524 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2008) (describes heavy burden for Franks hearing and omissions standard)
- United States v. Wharton, 840 F.3d 163 (4th Cir. 2016) (materiality requirement: false statements must be necessary to probable cause)
- United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (affidavits judged by commonsense; not hypertechnical pleading)
- United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (same; warrants interpreted reasonably, not as essay contest)
- United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2005) (probable cause to search residence of a known dealer even without direct evidence drugs kept there)
- United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (plain-error standard for unpreserved appellate claims)