United States v. Bell
158 F. Supp. 3d 906
N.D. Cal.2016Background
- Defendants Bell, Hart, and Johnson were indicted on multiple counts, including assault of a person assisting a federal officer (18 U.S.C. § 111), robbery of government property (18 U.S.C. § 2112), and using a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
- Count Four (§ 924(c)) predicates were Count Two (§ 111) and Count Three (§ 2112); defendants moved to dismiss Count Four arguing neither predicate qualifies as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).
- Legal framework: § 924(c)(3) defines “crime of violence” via (A) the force clause (requires violent physical force) and (B) the residual clause (substantial risk test); the Ninth Circuit applies the Taylor categorical approach and, for divisible statutes, the Descamps modified categorical approach.
- Court evaluated whether § 111 and § 2112 qualify under the force clause (requiring violent, intentional force) and whether § 2112 could be salvaged under the residual clause given Johnson v. United States (2015) (Johnson II).
- Rulings: § 111(b) (the felony variant involving a deadly/dangerous weapon or bodily injury) is a divisible statute and qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the force clause; § 2112 (robbery of government property) is not categorically a crime of violence under the force clause, is not divisible for modified categorical treatment, and cannot be saved by the residual clause because that clause is void for vagueness in this Circuit under Johnson II/Dimaya.
- Result: Defendants’ motions to dismiss Count Four were denied because § 111(b) supplies a valid § 924(c) predicate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 111 (assault on federal officer) is a § 924(c)(3) "crime of violence" under the force clause | Government: § 111(b) involves violent force (weapon or bodily injury) and is a qualifying predicate | Defendants: § 111(a)/(b) can criminalize non-violent or lesser force; Juvenile Female is inconsistent with Johnson I | Held: § 111(a) misdemeanor and some § 111(a) felony variants are not crimes of violence, but § 111(b) (weapon or bodily-injury variant) is a divisible offense and qualifies under the force clause |
| Whether § 2112 (robbery of government property) is a § 924(c)(3) "crime of violence" under the force clause | Government: robbery inherently involves force and can qualify as a violent felony | Defendants: common-law robbery can be satisfied by minimal force (e.g., snatching attached property) that is not "violent force" under Johnson I | Held: § 2112 is not categorically a crime of violence under the force clause because common-law robbery can encompass force too slight to be "violent force" |
| Whether § 2112 is divisible for the modified categorical approach | Government: (implicitly) could treat robbery variants as elements | Defendants: § 2112 uses disjunctive/common-law language and is not divisible | Held: § 2112 is not divisible (analogous to CA robbery ruling); modified categorical approach not available |
| Whether the § 924(c)(3) residual clause is constitutionally valid after Johnson II | Government: residual language differs from ACCA and some courts decline to extend Johnson II | Defendants: residual clause mirrors ACCA/§16(b) language and is void for vagueness | Held: § 924(c)(3) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague in this Circuit (Johnson II/Dimaya reasoning applies), so cannot salvage § 2112 as a predicate |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause held void for vagueness; central reasoning applied to categorical"ordinary-case" residual analysis)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (ACCA force-clause requires "violent force" capable of causing pain or injury)
- United States v. Dominguez-Maroyoqui, 748 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.) (§ 111 creates separate offenses; § 111(a) felony not categorically a crime of violence)
- United States v. Juvenile Female, 566 F.3d 943 (9th Cir.) (§ 111(b) is a crime of violence under force-clause/§16 analyses)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury constitutes "use" of physical force)
- Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.) (applied Johnson II to hold § 16(b) void for vagueness; persuasive authority extending Johnson II reasoning to similar residual clauses)