United States v. Beauty
3:11-cr-08139
D. Ariz.Jun 15, 2020Background
- Defendant Dexter Allan Beauty was convicted in 2013 of abusive sexual contact with a 14‑year‑old and sentenced to 24 months custody and 60 months supervised release; his supervised release had been revoked once before (2016).
- A 2020 probation petition alleged five violations of supervised release: lying to his probation officer, residing at an unauthorized residence, unapproved contact with minors, contact with the victim, and discharge from sex‑offender treatment.
- Probation Officer Leslie Cooper directed Beauty (after his wife’s arrest and other concerns) not to stay at his wife’s house; Beauty admitted staying there about two nights per week and admitted lying about that to Officer Cooper.
- Beauty was unsuccessfully discharged from West Winds sex‑offender treatment in April 2020 for multiple program violations (receiving nude images, unauthorized overnight stays, sexual contact with another woman, weapon use, failing assignments and polygraphs).
- The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Beauty violated conditions for lying (Standard Condition 4), residing at an unauthorized residence (Special Condition 3), unapproved contact with minors (Special Condition 7), and failing to complete required treatment (Special Condition 11); it found no violation as to victim contact (Special Condition 8).
- On de novo review of detention, the court affirmed that Beauty is a danger to the community and ordered him detained pending disposition (not a flight risk).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lying to probation officer (Std. Cond. 4) | Officer Cooper: Beauty admitted he lied about complying with her directive. | Beauty argued officer’s residence restriction was unconstitutional and undermined the basis of the questioning. | Court credited Cooper; found violation by preponderance. |
| Residing at unauthorized residence (Spec. Cond. 3) | Beauty stayed at wife’s house after being told not to; prior clarification defined “residence” as where he sleeps. | Beauty argued "residence" ambiguous and that officer lacked authority to bar him. | Court held condition was clear (probation clarification) and found violation. |
| Unapproved contact with minors (Spec. Cond. 7) | Beauty admitted being in company of minors on multiple occasions. | Beauty claimed chaperone (wife) made contact permitted. | Court held condition only excepted his own children; found violation. |
| Victim contact (Spec. Cond. 8) | Government suggested sightings of the victim near his trailer constituted prohibited contact. | Beauty did not approach or attempt contact; sightings resulted from victim’s presence. | Court found government failed to prove contact; no violation. |
| Discharge from sex‑offender treatment (Spec. Cond. 11) | Beauty was unsuccessfully discharged for multiple program breaches; probation officer properly required re‑enrollment. | Beauty argued officer lacked authority to require further treatment after 2018 completion. | Court held probation officer has authority to require/approve treatment; found violation. |
| Detention review | Government: Defendant’s offense, conduct, and discharge indicate danger to community. | Beauty argued release; cited community ties and employment. | On de novo review, court affirmed detention: not a flight risk but a danger; detained pending disposition. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (probation officer instructions inform fair warning of prohibited conduct)
- United States v. Romero, 676 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1982) (probation officer and court explanations inform supervision conditions)
- United States v. Ly, [citation="650 F. App'x 503"] (9th Cir. 2016) (probation officer may supplement supervision conditions with instructions)
- United States v. Goddard, 537 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008) (residence approval is reasonably related to sentencing goals for sex offenders)
- United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 2003) (probation officers may determine type and extent of required treatment)
- United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2005) (Congress grants probation officers broad authority to supervise and enforce conditions)