United States v. Barton Crandall, 25 F.4th 582

Barton Crandall was convicted in 1989 of bank robbery and multiple § 924(c) firearms offenses and designated a career offender; he received an aggregate sentence of 562 months (reduced to 526 months in 2005).
In 2020 Crandall filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing his sentence would be much lower under current law because the First Step Act eliminated mandatory consecutive § 924(c) “stacking” and Mathis v. United States would preclude career‑offender treatment.
The district court treated USSG § 1B1.13 as non‑binding but held that non‑retroactive changes in law cannot constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and that Crandall’s age, health, and rehabilitation did not otherwise warrant relief.
The court also reasoned it would be improper to effect retroactivity by deeming prospective legislative changes to be “extraordinary and compelling,” and that compassionate release is not a vehicle for resentencing based on changed policy.
On appeal the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding a non‑retroactive change in law cannot support compassionate release and that Mathis did not provide a collateral remedy because it is not retroactive and guideline challenges are not cognizable under § 2255 in this posture.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a non‑retroactive change in sentencing law can be an “extraordinary and compelling” reason under § 3582(c)(1)(A)	First Step Act and sentencing reforms justify reduction despite lack of retroactivity	Congress declined retroactivity; allowing relief would nullify Congress’s choice and expand relief beyond statute	No — non‑retroactive changes in law cannot constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons
Whether an intervening judicial interpretation (Mathis) that would alter guideline classification can justify release	Mathis would eliminate career‑offender status, greatly reducing guideline range	Mathis is not retroactive on collateral review; § 2255 or direct appeal are proper remedies, not compassionate release	No — Mathis does not provide a basis for § 3582 relief in Crandall’s posture
Whether USSG § 1B1.13 binds courts considering defendant‑filed motions after the First Step Act	Court may treat § 1B1.13 as inapplicable to defendant‑filed motions	Statute requires consistency with applicable policy statements; question whether § 1B1.13 still “applicable”	Not decided as unnecessary — the court affirmed on other grounds and treated the issue as academic

United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020) (§ 924(c) sentence disparity can be an extraordinary and compelling reason)
United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2021) (non‑retroactive § 924(c) reform and youth can support relief)
United States v. McCall, 20 F.4th 1108 (6th Cir. 2021) (agreeing with McCoy/Maumau rationale)
United States v. Owens, 996 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2021) (same)
United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding non‑retroactive change cannot justify compassionate release)
United States v. Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2021) (same)
United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021) (rejecting relief based on prospective policy change; no limiting principle)
United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021) (concluding non‑retroactive change cannot create an extraordinary and compelling reason)
United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding legally impermissible grounds cannot be rescued by combining them with other factors)
United States v. Marcussen, 15 F.4th 855 (8th Cir. 2021) (noting that § 1B1.13 may be advisory but consistency with applicable policy statements is required by statute)