United States v. Banyai
637 F. App'x 532
| 10th Cir. | 2016Background
- In 2010 Marc Thomas Banyai pleaded guilty to drug and gun offenses and was sentenced as a career offender to 120 months imprisonment and 60 months supervised release.
- He moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a sentence reduction based on Amendment 782 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered base offense levels for many drug offenses by two levels.
- The district court denied the motion, reasoning career offenders are ineligible for Amendment 782 relief because their sentences are calculated under § 4B1.1, not §§ 2D1.1/2D1.11.
- Banyai contested that he was a career offender and later urged that Johnson v. United States (vagueness of the residual clause) entitled him to relief, but he did not raise that Johnson argument in district court.
- The Tenth Circuit granted in forma pauperis status, held the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Banyai’s § 3582(c)(2) motion, and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Amendment 782 authorizes a § 3582(c)(2) reduction for a defendant sentenced as a career offender | Banyai: Amendment 782 lowers his guideline range and permits a sentence reduction | Government/District Court: Career-offender sentences are governed by § 4B1.1, not § 2D1.1/2D1.11, so Amendment 782 does not apply | Court: Career offenders are not eligible under Amendment 782; district court lacked jurisdiction under § 3582(c)(2), so the motion must be dismissed |
| Whether the district court had jurisdiction to grant § 3582(c)(2) relief | Banyai: Court can modify sentence under § 3582(c)(2) because the Sentencing Commission lowered the guideline | Government: § 3582(c)(2) only authorizes reductions where the amendment affects the guideline used to compute the sentence; here it does not | Court: Jurisdiction is absent when no applicable § 3582(c) exception exists; dismissal required |
| Whether Banyai was actually sentenced as a career offender | Banyai: He denies the career-offender designation | Presentence report/district court: Probation classified him as a career offender; court adopted the PSR | Court: He was sentenced as a career offender; the career-offender calculation governs eligibility |
| Whether Banyai can raise a Johnson vagueness challenge on appeal | Banyai: Johnson renders the career-offender residual clause unconstitutionally vague and affects his sentence | Government: He failed to raise Johnson below, so argument is forfeited | Court: Declines to consider Johnson argument because it was not raised in district court or plain-error preserved |
Key Cases Cited
- DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.3d 502 (11th Cir.) (IFP standards)
- United States v. White, 765 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir.) (district courts lack power to modify sentences absent § 3582(c) exception)
- United States v. Graham, 704 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir.) (motions outside § 3582(c) should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction)
- United States v. Lamirand, 669 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir.) (procedural forfeiture and plain-error principles)
- United States v. Taylor, 778 F.3d 667 (7th Cir.) (treats § 3582(c)(2) ineligibility as non-jurisdictional)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (residual-clause vagueness decision)