899 F.3d 123
2d Cir.2018Background
- Raymond Baker was convicted by a jury of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 100+ grams of heroin (21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, 851) after five controlled transactions in early–mid 2015.
- Co-conspirator Kandi Kennedy (who pled guilty) testified that Baker supplied her drugs, handed heroin to her at her house, often accompanied her to sales, and received 90% of proceeds.
- Evidence included CI testimony, recorded calls and texts (wiretap on Kennedy), audio/video of transactions, phone records, and use of a vehicle registered to Baker at several transactions.
- On June 16, 2015, Kennedy and Baker were arrested at or near a shopping plaza after Kennedy was observed selling to confidential informants.
- Post-verdict, Juror No. 10 emailed defense counsel alleging jurors discussed the case during breaks and that one juror said he ‘‘knew the defendant was guilty the first time he saw him.’’ Defense sought leave to interview jurors; the district court denied the request.
- Baker appealed, arguing (1) insufficiency of the evidence and (2) error in denying post-verdict juror interviews; the Second Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of the evidence to convict Baker of conspiracy to distribute 100+ g heroin | Govt: Kennedy’s testimony plus corroborating records, recordings, CI testimony, and presence at transactions supported conviction | Baker: Kennedy was an incredible, self-interested accomplice; evidence was insufficient and uncorroborated | Affirmed — viewing evidence in govt’s favor, Kennedy’s uncorroborated accomplice testimony was sufficient and was corroborated by phone records, recordings, vehicle use, and CI evidence |
| Denial of request to conduct post-verdict juror interviews | Govt: Juror No.10’s email did not provide clear, incontrovertible evidence of prejudicial misconduct or racial animus to warrant interviews | Baker: Juror email alleged premature deliberations and a juror predisposed to guilt (possibly racial bias), triggering post-verdict inquiry and Peña‑Rodriguez exception | Affirmed — district court did not abuse discretion; juror statements were speculative, concerned juror statements (not extraneous influence), and Rule 606(b) barred impeachment of deliberative process; Peña‑Rodriguez inapplicable without a clear racial‑bias statement |
Key Cases Cited
- Brock v. United States, 789 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2015) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence; deferential to jury)
- Pierce v. United States, 785 F.3d 832 (2d Cir. 2015) (verdict upheld if any rational trier of fact could convict)
- Parker v. United States, 903 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1990) (uncorroborated accomplice testimony can support conviction if not incredible)
- Florez v. United States, 447 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2006) (credibility attacks based on plea deals and criminal history are for the jury)
- Hassan v. United States, 578 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2008) (credit every inference for the government on sufficiency review)
- Sabhnani v. United States, 599 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2010) (abuse-of-discretion standard for juror‑misconduct inquiries)
- Moon v. United States, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983) (post‑verdict inquiry requires clear, strong, substantial, incontrovertible evidence of specific impropriety)
- Ianniello v. United States, 866 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1989) (concrete, competent allegations required to trigger juror inquiry)
- Vitale v. United States, 459 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2006) (trial judge determines effect of potentially prejudicial occurrences)
- Moten v. United States, 582 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1978) (trial court control over post‑verdict juror contact; avoid fishing expeditions)
- Peña‑Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (narrow Sixth Amendment exception allowing juror testimony where clear statement shows reliance on racial stereotypes or animus)
- Leung v. United States, 796 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2015) (Rule 606(b) bars juror testimony about deliberative mental processes, including premature deliberation effects)
- Morales v. United States, 655 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2011) (speculative post‑verdict claims of premature deliberation insufficient; Rule 606(b) limits inquiry)
- Richards v. United States, 241 F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 2001) (denying new trial where juror overheard premature comments; Rule 606(b) bars inquiry into effect on verdict)
- Rosario v. United States, 111 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1997) (presumption jurors follow oath and court instructions)
- King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1978) (vague, speculative post‑trial evidence insufficient for hearing)
- Annabi v. United States, 560 F. App’x 69 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order affirming denial of post‑verdict interview where jurors spoke during lunch)
- Cartelli v. United States, 272 F. App’x 66 (2d Cir. 2008) (speculation about jurors’ conversations insufficient to warrant inquiry)