United States v. Bain, 155 F. Supp. 3d 107

Bain was indicted on April 30, 2014 for distribution and possession with intent to distribute heroin and for being a felon in possession of firearms; he moved to suppress evidence from a search of 131 Laurel Street, Apt. D.
Warrant for 131 Laurel Street, Apt. D Malden, MA was sought based on an affidavit by DEA Agent Connerney with information from a confidential witness and controlled drug buys.
Bain’s car (brown Cadillac) and his presence near the Moody Street and Laurel Street locations linked him to the drug activity; Bain previously lived at or near 32 Henderson Street and had a history of drug-trafficking convictions.
CW-1 conducted two controlled heroin buys from Bain (Feb. 26, 2014 outside 685 Moody Street and Mar. 21, 2014 near Waite Street), with the drugs testing positive for heroin and fentanyl; Bain’s Cadillac was observed near the locations.
On April 1, 2014, after Bain’s arrest, officers used keys found on Bain to enter 131 Laurel Street, observed Bain’s mailing and other evidence in plain view, and connected the residence to Bain’s drug activities.
The warrant authorized the search for documents, records, and currency; officers found items including an electronic scale, a .45 firearm, heroin, pills, Bain’s IDs, cash, and a credit-card machine.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to contest search of Apt D	Bain showed overnight occupancy and personal use	Bain had privacy rights in Apt D	Bain had a privacy interest; standing established
Entrance into 131 Laurel Street with Bain’s keys	Entry was an unlawful search	No Fourth Amendment violation under curtilage/entry rules	Entry did not constitute unlawful entry based on curtilage analysis and prior case law
Curtilage and doorknob testing as a search	Threshold testing/lock insertion violated Fourth Amendment	Jardines/Jones broaden protections; door area may be curtilage	Turning the key into the lock was unconstitutional, but suppression not warranted due to good-faith reliance on Lyons/Hawkins
Exigent circumstances for warrantless Apartment D entry	Existence of destruction-of-evidence threat	No exigent circumstances shown	No objectively reasonable basis for exigent circumstances; warrantless entry not justified
Probable cause to searched 131 Laurel Street Apt D	Apt D housing Bain and nexus to drug dealing	Probable cause insufficient to connect apartment to Bain’s drug activity	Probable cause shown by cumulative inference: Bain’s residence, keys, proximity of transactions, and prior drug-trafficking history

Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (overnight guest privacy interest in home)
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (definition of curtilage)
Jardines v. Florida, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (unlicensed physical intrusion on curtilage constitutes search)
Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Katz expanded by trespass-based approach to searches)
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (curtilage factors for home protection area)
United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29 (1998) (common areas and lack of privacy rights in apartment buildings)
Concepcion v. United States, 942 F.2d 1172 (1992) (guides probable cause analysis for home searches)
Lyons, 898 F.2d 210 (1990) (keys in lock historically not a search under Katz pre-Jardines)
Feliz v. United States, 182 F.3d 82 (1999) (probable cause to search home based on trafficking pattern and home storage)
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (home-entry/searches and privacy expectations)