950 F.3d 119
1st Cir.2020Background
- Báez-Martínez was convicted in 2012 under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession; his unobjected-to PSR listed prior Puerto Rico convictions: one second-degree murder (1996), two attempted murders, and two carjackings.
- The district court applied the ACCA, imposing the 15-year mandatory minimum; this Court affirmed the conviction in 2015.
- After the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States invalidated the ACCA residual clause, the Supreme Court remanded Báez-Martínez’s case to determine whether remaining clauses still supported ACCA treatment.
- On remand the district court found second-degree murder and attempted murder qualify under the ACCA force clause and resentenced him to 180 months; Báez-Martínez appealed.
- The First Circuit reviewed de novo whether the Puerto Rico convictions categorically qualify as ACCA "violent felonies," addressed mens rea distinctions (ordinary recklessness vs. depraved-heart/malice), and rejected the claim that the government waived ACCA predicates by failing to specially designate them initially.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Puerto Rico second-degree murder is a violent felony under the ACCA force clause given mens rea concerns | Government: Puerto Rico murder requires malice aforethought (including depraved-heart), which entails heightened recklessness/near-knowledge and thus satisfies the force clause | Báez-Martínez: Puerto Rico second-degree murder can be committed with ordinary recklessness, which does not satisfy the ACCA force clause | Held: Counts. Puerto Rico law requires malice aforethought (depraved-heart/heightened recklessness), which suffices under the force clause. |
| Whether attempted murder qualifies as a violent felony under the force clause, including when based on omissions | Government: Attempted murder requires specific intent to kill and involves attempted use of violent force; bodily injury/attempted bodily injury entails physical (violent) force | Báez-Martínez: Omissions cannot be "physical force"; crimes completed by omission (e.g., starvation) should not qualify | Held: Counts. Following Castleman and related reasoning, attempted murder involves (attempted) violent force and qualifies under the force clause. |
| Whether the government waived ACCA sentencing by not specifically designating predicate convictions at initial sentencing | Government: PSR listed all prior convictions and gave notice; no requirement to exhaustively label specific predicates; court may assess predicates on remand | Báez-Martínez: Due process required identification/designation of ACCA predicates; government cannot redesignate on remand | Held: No waiver. PSR notice was sufficient; no rule requires exhaustive, initial designation of particular ACCA predicates. |
| Whether the ACCA still applied given the remaining qualifying predicates | Government: Murder + two attempted murders provide three violent-felony predicates | Báez-Martínez: Lacked three qualifying predicates once residual clause struck down | Held: Affirmed. Second-degree murder and two attempted-murder convictions provide the three ACCA predicates; 15-year mandatory minimum affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) ("use" requires a higher degree of intent than negligence)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (limits scope of offenses qualifying under ACCA residual/analogs)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (struck down ACCA residual clause as void for vagueness)
- Castleman v. United States, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (causing bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach and realistic probability standard)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (attempted murder as classic example of crime the residual clause once covered)
- In re Irby, 858 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2017) (federal second-degree murder is a crime of violence under analogous analyses)