United States v. Aumbrey Winstead
890 F.3d 1082
| D.C. Cir. | 2018Background
- Winstead was convicted by a jury of (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and (3) possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); charges arose after a car accident, his flight into woods, officers finding two guns where he had been seen bending over, and 25 small bags of cocaine found in his pocket.
- Recordings of jail calls placed from Winstead’s phone were played at trial; one caller said he had hidden “hammers” (guns) for a co-defendant and another call referenced a recent apartment search that recovered firearms, drugs, and packaging similar to items found on Winstead.
- The government introduced three of Winstead’s prior convictions (1998 attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine; 2002 attempted distribution of marijuana; 2004 felon-in-possession) for impeachment and to show knowledge/intent; the jury convicted despite defense testimony denying ownership/voice in recordings.
- Winstead appealed evidentiary rulings (admission of prior crimes as stale under Rules 403/404(b)) and raised ineffective-assistance claims for trial and sentencing; the district court sentenced him as a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1 to 360 months (bottom of the career-offender range), a roughly 10-year increase from the non-career range.
- A primary sentencing issue: whether the Guidelines’ definition of “controlled substance offense” (USSG § 4B1.2(b))—which lists substantive offenses but does not textually include attempts—permits the Sentencing Commission’s commentary (Application Note 1) to treat inchoate offenses (attempt, conspiracy, aiding/abetting) as qualifying offenses for career-offender status.
- Defense counsel did not preserve the textual objection to treating attempted offenses as qualifying; Winstead argued ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing for failure to press that argument.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Winstead) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of prior-crime evidence (staleness / Rule 403/404(b)) | Prior convictions were probative of knowledge/intent (tools of the trade, similar packaging/guns) and not unduly prejudicial. | The prior convictions, some quite old, were stale and their prejudicial effect outweighed probative value. | Court: Admission may have been erroneous under staleness doctrine, but any error was harmless given overwhelming evidence of guilt. |
| Sufficiency / overall guilt | Evidence (witnesses, officers, recovered guns, cocaine baggies, and jail calls) established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. | Denied ownership/voice; testified innocent explanations for presence near guns and calls. | Court: Government’s case was overwhelming; convictions affirmed. |
| Whether attempted drug offenses may count as "controlled substance offenses" for career-offender status (textual scope of USSG § 4B1.2(b) vs. Application Note 1) | The Commission’s commentary validly interprets § 4B1.2 to include attempts; sister circuits defer to Application Note 1. | The guideline text defines the offenses and does not include attempts; the commentary impermissibly expands the guideline beyond its text. | Court: Commentary exceeds the guideline text; attempted offenses do not qualify as controlled substance offenses under § 4B1.2(b). Defendant wins on the merits. |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing for failing to raise the textual challenge | No direct response at sentencing; argues plain-error standard applies because issue not raised below. | Counsel’s omission was serious; had counsel raised it, there was a reasonable probability of a lower guideline range and different sentence. | Court: Failure to raise the pure-text legal argument was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial; remanded for resentencing (ineffective assistance at sentencing proven as matter of law). |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Sheffield, 832 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (staleness of prior conviction may render it inadmissible to show knowledge)
- United States v. McCarson, 527 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (limiting instruction practices)
- United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (possession of a firearm can be probative of intent/knowledge in drug cases)
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines is authoritative unless inconsistent with the guideline)
- United States v. Price, 990 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (reversed career-offender sentence where commentary impermissibly expanded guideline scope)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (statutory definition did not include attempted burglary where text excluded inchoate offense)
- Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124 (2008) (definitions that declare what a term "means" exclude unstated meanings)
- Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (Guidelines are the starting point and strongly inform sentencing)
- United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (remand practice for unresolved ineffective-assistance claims)
- United States v. (Norman) Williams, 350 F.3d 128 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (procedural default/plain-error review of unpreserved guideline objections)
- United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (rejecting sister-circuit precedent inconsistent with statutory text)