United States v. Arthur Starks, Jr.
674 F. App'x 580
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- Defendant Arthur Lee Starks, Jr. pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 80 months’ imprisonment after an upward variance.
- The PSR treated a 2008 Arkansas conviction for third-degree domestic battering (Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-305) as a qualifying “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), producing a base offense level of 20, reduced for acceptance of responsibility to total offense level 17.
- With a criminal history category V, the Guidelines range was 46–57 months; the district court varied upward to 80 months citing Starks’s violent criminal history and public/family safety concerns and mentioning his alcohol and possible mental-health needs.
- Starks appealed, arguing (1) his Arkansas domestic-battering conviction is not a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines’ force clause, so the base offense level was calculated incorrectly, and (2) the upward variance was substantively unreasonable because the court improperly considered rehabilitation/treatment needs (Tapia error).
- The Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo the Guidelines interpretation and applied the (modified) categorical approach; it concluded the conviction was for subsection (a)(1) (purposefully causing physical injury) and that subsection (a)(1) falls within the force clause.
- The court also reviewed the Tapia argument for plain error, assumed any reference to treatment needs might be improper but found Starks failed to show prejudice from that error; the judgment was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Arkansas § 5-26-305(a)(1) is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (force clause) | Starks: conviction can be committed without the “use” of physical force; statute broader than force-clause requires | Government: statute’s subsection (a)(1) requires purposeful causing of physical injury — necessarily involves use of force; record shows conviction under (a)(1) | Affirmed: (a)(1) has as an element the use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force and is a crime of violence; modified categorical approach properly applied |
| Whether Mathis/other Supreme Court precedent undermines precedent treating Arkansas battery subsections as crimes of violence | Starks: Mathis shows divisible statutes may still be broader; supports narrowing | Government: § 5-26-305 sets out alternative elements (not mere alternative means); Eighth Circuit precedent controls | Affirmed: Mathis does not disturb prior Eighth Circuit holdings; subsection (a)(1) is an alternative element and crime of violence |
| Whether Voisine affects the force-clause analysis | Starks: Voisine’s discussion of “use” suggests some harms without force fall outside force clause | Government: Voisine addressed mens rea for misdemeanor domestic violence; does not negate (a)(1)’s purposeful element | Affirmed: Voisine is inapposite—issues differ (mens rea vs. deliberate-purpose element) |
| Whether the upward variance was substantively unreasonable due to Tapia error | Starks: district court relied on need to address alcohol/mental-health needs, which Tapia forbids as a basis to increase sentence | Government: district court primarily relied on violent criminal history and public safety; any Tapia error did not affect outcome | Affirmed: even assuming error, Starks fails plain-error showing of prejudice; proper sentencing factors dominated |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rice, 813 F.3d 704 (8th Cir.) (applying categorical analysis to Arkansas battery statute)
- United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d 633 (8th Cir.) (holding Ark. § 5-26-305 divisible for ACCA purposes)
- United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476 (8th Cir.) (statutory element requiring causing physical injury by deadly weapon falls within force clause)
- United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790 (8th Cir.) (categorical approach and modified categorical approach discussion)
- Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (Sup. Ct.) (causing bodily injury necessarily involves use of force)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (Sup. Ct.) (distinguishing alternative elements from alternative means)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (Sup. Ct.) (interpreting “use” of force for reckless misdemeanor domestic violence)
- Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (Sup. Ct.) (district courts may not lengthen sentences to promote rehabilitation or to ensure participation in treatment)