United States v. Arthur Smith
582 F. App'x 590
6th Cir.2014Background
- Arthur Smith pleaded guilty to armed pharmacy robbery, firearm charges, and being a felon in possession, in the Eastern District of Tennessee.
- PSR classified Smith as a career offender under § 4B1.1(a) based on two predicates, including a North Carolina common-law robbery conviction.
- Two predicate offenses used for career-offender status: a 2008 South Carolina controlled-substance conviction and a 1999 North Carolina common-law robbery conviction.
- The district court held that NC common-law robbery is a crime of violence under the residual clause § 4B1.2(a)(2) and sentenced Smith under the career-offender calculation.
- Smith argued the NC robbery conviction is not a crime of violence and that Sixth Amendment concerns about judicial fact-finding apply; the district court denied these and final sentence was 262 months.
- The Sixth Circuit reviews de novo legal questions about guideline ranges and agrees that the NC offense can be categorized as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether NC common-law robbery is a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2). | Smith contends it is not a crime of violence. | The government contends it falls within the residual clause as a serious risk of injury. | Yes; NC common-law robbery is categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause. |
| Divisibility and use of the modified categorical approach for NC common-law robbery. | Smith argues the statute’s elements may not render it a predicate crime. | The government supports treating it as divisible and analyzable under the modified categorical approach. | Common-law robbery is a divisible offense; the modified categorical approach applies to determine the applicable predicate elements. |
| Whether the 'fear' element in NC common-law robbery presents a serious risk of physical injury in the ordinary case. | Fear could be fear of non-physical harms, potentially not serious risk. | Fear of bodily harm is encompassed by the statute and presents a serious risk. | In the ordinary case, fear of bodily injury presents a serious risk, supporting categorization as a crime of violence. |
| Whether the Sixth Amendment requires charging and proving prior convictions to enhance penalties (Almendarez-Torres). | Smith preserves an argument to overrule Almendarez-Torres. | Almendarez-Torres remains controlling and permits judicial fact-finding of prior convictions. | Constitutional under Almendarez-Torres; prior convictions may be used to enhance penalties without jury finding. |
| Whether the district court correctly applied the career-offender rules in light of the NC robbery predicate. | Smith contends the NC predicate is invalid, undermining the career-offender designation. | NC common-law robbery qualifies as a crime of violence, satisfying § 4B1.1(a). | District court correctly classified Smith as a career offender under § 4B1.1(a). |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gibbs, 626 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2010) (treats whether an offense is a crime of violence under the Manual the same as ACCA violent-felony analysis)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (U.S. 2013) (divisible statutes and the modified categorical approach)
- Mitchell v. United States, 743 F.3d 1054 (6th Cir. 2014) (robbery under Tennessee law; residual-clause analysis under 4B1.2)
- Fraker v. United States, 458 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2012) (robbery under Tennessee law not categorically a violent felony under the residual clause)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (construing violent felony and residual-clause definitions; reference to ACCA/means for dividing offenses)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1990) (definition of burglary in ACCA as building or structure; aids residually in other contexts)
- State v. Sawyer, 29 S.E.2d 34 (N.C. 1944) (definition of fear in NC common-law robbery; fear can refer to bodily injury)