United States v. Arnold Maurice Mathis
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18297
| 11th Cir. | 2014Background
- Defendant Arnold M. Mathis, a registered sex offender, sexually abused Jarvis J. (age 14–15) in 2004 and later (2011) solicited sexually explicit pictures from two minors (Jerel A. and Harold J.) via his cell phone; Jarvis reported the 2004 abuse in 2011 and recorded a call in which Mathis acknowledged the abuse.
- Police seized Mathis’s 2011 Sprint smartphone after arrest and obtained a warrant to search its contents; an initial forensic exam (Dec. 2011) recovered call logs, contacts, and SMS but not MMS; an updated tool used in Aug. 2012 retrieved MMS (multimedia) messages.
- A second superseding indictment charged Mathis with production/attempted production of child pornography (Count One—Jerel), attempted production (Count Two—Harold), enticement of a minor via interstate commerce (Count Three—Jarvis) under § 2422(b), and committing those offenses while required to register as a sex offender (Count Four—§ 2260A).
- Mathis moved to suppress the phone evidence (arguing staleness, misleading affidavit, and that the Aug. 2012 exam exceeded the warrant). The district court denied suppression and later denied a renewed motion; a jury convicted on all counts.
- At sentencing the court applied enhancements including U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6) (use of a computer/interactive service) and statutory § 2251(e) enhancements based on a 1995 Florida conviction; total sentence was 480 months. Mathis appealed multiple issues; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed but remanded to correct a clerical error in the judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Mathis’s Argument (Plaintiff) | Government’s Argument (Defendant) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of search warrant / affidavit | Affidavit was misleading/stale because Mathis used a different phone in 2004 and Jarvis’s texts weren’t sexual; therefore no probable cause for searching the 2011 phone | Affidavit connected Mathis to the phone (same number, recorded call) and law‑enforcement experience supported belief relevant evidence could remain on the phone; good‑faith reliance on the warrant | Warrant valid or, alternatively, Leon good‑faith exception applies; suppression denied |
| August 2012 second forensic exam | Second exam (8 months later) exceeded warrant’s scope/timeframe and recovered MMS not available earlier | Initial exam (within warrant period) recovered SMS; even if later exam exceeded scope, admission of MMS was harmless because SMS were overwhelming evidence | Admission of MMS harmless error; no reversal |
| Confrontation Clause re: Jerel’s text messages | Admission of Jerel’s texts violated Sixth Amendment because they were introduced without allowing confrontation | Texts were non‑testimonial informal statements; defendant had opportunity to cross‑examine the declarant (who appeared) | Text messages were non‑testimonial; Confrontation Clause not violated |
| Sufficiency of evidence (Counts 1–4) | Insufficient proof of production/attempt/enticement and of sex‑offender registration timing | Multiple texts, images, witness testimony, and registration documents supported convictions | Evidence sufficient on all counts |
| § 2G2.1(b)(6) computer enhancement | Enhancement improper because Mathis used basic phone/texting, not Internet/computer services | A smartphone is a “computer” under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1); its use to communicate with minors supports the enhancement | Court holds cell phones/smartphones fall within § 1030(e)(1); enhancement proper (or harmless because guideline range unchanged) |
| § 2251(e) prior‑conviction enhancement | Prior Florida § 800.04 conviction did not necessarily require sexual contact; Sixth Amendment/Apprendi/Alleyne issues | § 2251(e) applies to prior convictions “relating to” sexual abuse; Almendarez‑Torres permits using prior convictions to enhance without jury finding | Enhancement under § 2251(e) affirmed; prior conviction qualifies; Sixth Amendment challenge rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (presumption of validity of warrant affidavits)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (good‑faith exception to exclusionary rule)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (probable cause is a practical, commonsense determination)
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (cell phones likely to contain incriminating information; heightened privacy concerns in phone searches)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (statutory‑range facts and jury findings principle)
- Almendarez‑Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (prior convictions may be used to enhance sentence without jury finding)
- United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900 (cell phones as "computers" under § 1030(e)(1))