United States v. Arizona
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7413
| 9th Cir. | 2011Background
- United States sued Arizona to challenge SB 1070 as preempted by the INA and as conflicting with the Commerce Clause.
- District court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Sections 2(B), 3, 5(C), and 6 of SB 1070.
- Arizona appealed the injunction as to those four sections; the United States did not cross-appeal the partial denial for other provisions.
- Issue presented: whether the district court properly enjoined the four sections under preemption doctrine, with standard of review de novo for preemption and abuse of discretion for injunction.
- The court analyzes general preemption principles and then assesses Sections 2(B), 3, 5(C), and 6 for preemption, considering congressional intent, field/obstacle preemption, and effects on foreign relations.
- The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirms the injunction as to Sections 2(B), 3, 5(C), and 6, finding likely preemption and irreparable harm balancing in favor of the United States.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Section 2(B) preemption? | States may cooperate under § 1357(g) and § 1373(c); § 2(B) conflicts with federal enforcement priorities. | Section 2(B) simply requires status checks consistent with federal inquiries and does not obstruct federal priorities. | Likely preempted; Section 2(B) stands as obstacle to Congress. |
| Section 3 preemption? | SB 1070 § 3 aligns with federal registration duties and may be permissible. | Section 3 interferes with a comprehensive federal registration scheme and is preempted. | Likely preempted; Section 3 conflicts with INA registration framework. |
| Section 5(C) preemption? | State may deter unauthorized work consistent with IRCA goals; Section 5(C) is a permissible deterrent. | Congress intentionally relied on employer sanctions, not criminalizing work by unauthorized workers. | Likely preempted; Section 5(C) conflicts with IRCA’s scheme and goals. |
| Section 6 preemption? | State inherent authority to enforce civil provisions of immigration law; § 1252c does not limit that authority. | Section 6 expands state arrest power beyond what Congress authorized and conflicts with federal enforcement scheme. | Likely preempted; Section 6 interferes with federal removability framework. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (preemption analysis begins with Congress's purpose; strong presumption against preemption in traditional state areas)
- Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (foreign relations preemption; federal authority to speak on foreign policy objectives)
- Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (complete federal scheme preemption concept; states cannot undermine federal objectives)
- Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (facial preemption standard: challenger must show no set of circumstances under which law would be valid)
- Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (flexibility in federal regulatory framework; state actions cannot undermine federal objectives)
- Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (foreign relations impact of state action; executive agreements and policy goals)
- Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (comprehensive federal scheme; generality of state regulation may not preempt)
- Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (primary purpose of immigration is to preserve jobs for American workers)
- Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999) (authority of §1252c and state arrest powers; preemption analysis divergent across circuits)
- Isla Petroleum Corp. v. Porto Rico Dept., 485 U.S. 495 (1988) (preemption inferred from inaction plus action in a federal scheme context)