United States v. Anthony Scott, 693 F.3d 715

Scott apprehended May 28, 2008 near a robbery scene; Miranda rights given with a written Advice of Rights form showing rights and Scott’s responses.
Scott initially declined to speak; later testified police told him they would transport him and return the next day to talk.
May 29 and May 30, 2008: detectives again administered Advice of Rights forms; Scott answered yes to both questions and gave multiple confessions.
District court denied suppression motion for statements; trial proceeded resulting in sixteen-count conviction for robbery-related offenses.
Scott argued Miranda rights were violated and that his mother's testimony about his statements should be admitted; the court remanded on some issues and affirmed excluding the mother’s testimony.
Court remanded to determine whether Scott or police initiated post-invocation discussions under Edwards; decision on coercion deferred.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Scott invoke the right to counsel on May 28?	Scott verbally invoked; district court credited officer over Scott.	Taylor’s testimony credible; no verbal invocation by Scott.	No reversal on verbal invocation; credibility findings upheld.
Did Scott unambiguously invoke the right to counsel by answering 'no' to speak now?	Yes, the form’s wording ties “these rights” to counsel.	No clear invocation; ambiguous form reading.	Scott invoked the right to counsel.
If invocation occurred, did subsequent statements occur before/after waiver?	Post-invocation statements may be coerced if initiated by police.	Waiver depends on who initiated subsequent discussion; unsettled on remand.	Remand to determine who initiated; coercion merits not decided.
Was testimony from Scott’s mother about his statements admissible for impeachment?	Mother’s testimony could impeach Hutchison’s testimony.	Hearsay and lack of personal knowledge; excluded.	Exclusion affirmed.

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (must immediately cease questioning when right to counsel is asserted)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1994) (right to counsel must be unambiguously invoked; police need not clarify ambiguous statements)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 131 S. Ct. 2250 (U.S. 2010) (ambiguity requires clear waiver of rights)
Tolliver v. Sheets, 594 F.3d 900 (6th Cir. 2010) (unambiguous invocation required; form context matters)
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (U.S. 1991) (invocation must be clearly expressed; silence or equivocation insufficient)
United States v. Brown, 287 F.3d 965 (10th Cir. 2002) (intoxicated, conflicting form responses not unambiguous invocation)
United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2005) (form questions can create clear invocation when references to rights include counsel)
Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279 (U.S. 1991) (coercion concerns in coerced confessions)
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (U.S. 1986) (presumes no waiver if invoked counsel and interrogation resumed by government)