United States v. Anthony Rice
409 U.S. App. D.C. 105
| D.C. Cir. | 2014Background
- Rice was charged in October 2003 with a multi-defendant, international drug conspiracy based largely on hundreds/thousands of hours of Spanish-language wiretaps; he was arrested and arraigned November 12, 2003.
- Six foreign codefendants remained abroad, some awaiting extradition; the government moved (unopposed by Rice) for a 270-day ends-of-justice continuance because of the case’s complexity.
- The district court granted the continuance on December 19, 2003; later the court sua sponte proposed and then ordered severance of domestic and international defendants (Rice placed among domestic group).
- Multiple scheduling postponements (codefendant counsel changes, defense counsel availability, court calendar) pushed the domestic trial start from the initial schedule to January 2006.
- Rice’s suppression motion of electronic surveillance was heard January 4, 2006; trial began January 9, 2006; Rice was convicted after a five-week trial and later sentenced to life.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Rice) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 26-month delay violated the Speedy Trial Act (70-day limit) | The December 2003 270-day ends-of-justice continuance was invalid (procedurally and substantively); further, many days after that continuance and before trial were nonexcludable | The continuance was valid (case complexity, translations, foreign defendants); subsequent delays were excludable either as part of that continuance or as time tolled by pending pretrial motions | Court held the continuance and motion-pendency exclusions valid; Rice failed to identify >180 nonexcludable days; Speedy Trial Act claim rejected |
| Whether the district court abused discretion by not severing defendants before granting the continuance | Court should have severed domestic defendants (making the continuance unnecessary) and thus abused discretion by not doing so sua sponte | Preference for joint trials and absence of any severance motion by defendants justified the court’s decision; no abuse of discretion | Court held no abuse of discretion; severance was neither required nor obviously appropriate at that time |
| Whether the district court’s on-the-record ends-of-justice findings satisfied § 3161(h)(7)(A) | Findings were procedurally deficient and did not show serious balancing of speedy-trial interests | Court gave detailed oral findings citing number of defendants, foreign extraditions, and volume/translation of wiretaps—showing serious weighing | Court held the record contained adequate contemporaneous findings and the continuance was procedurally adequate |
| Whether the delay violated the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial | Delay violated constitutional right regardless of statutory compliance | Government: Rice forfeited constitutional claim by not raising it below; in any event Barker factors do not show a clear or obvious constitutional error | Court held Rice forfeited the claim; under plain-error review there was no clear or obvious Sixth Amendment violation; Barker factors did not establish reversible constitutional error |
Key Cases Cited
- Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (discusses 70-day Speedy Trial Act rule) (procedural exclusion rules under the Act)
- Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (procedural strictness for ends-of-justice findings)
- Bryant v. United States, 523 F.3d 349 (D.C. Cir.) (requirement that court seriously weigh interests when granting continuance)
- Sanders v. United States, 485 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir.) (insufficient post-hoc/ex parte findings for continuance)
- Lopesierra-Gutierrez v. United States, 708 F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir.) (upholding similar continuance where complexity and foreign-witness issues justified delay)
- Van Smith v. United States, 530 F.3d 967 (D.C. Cir.) (treatment of pretrial motion pendency under the Act)
- Kelley v. United States, 36 F.3d 1118 (D.C. Cir.) (deference to district court on ends-of-justice balancing)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (preference for joint trials and limits on severance)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (Sixth Amendment speedy-trial balancing test)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (threshold for Barker analysis on delay length)
- Marcus v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2159 (plain-error standard in criminal appeals)
- Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (attribution of delay to defendant when caused by defense counsel scheduling)
- Bieganowski v. United States, 313 F.3d 264 (noting unusualness where Act complied with but Sixth Amendment violated)
- Davenport v. United States, 935 F.2d 1223 (similar principle on relation between statutory and constitutional speedy-trial claims)
- Nance v. United States, 666 F.2d 353 (same)