United States v. Anthony Evans
883 F.3d 1154
9th Cir.2018Background
- On July 15, 2015 surveillance video showed Anthony Evans (a felon on supervised release) was shot five times and then fired multiple shots at an apparent assailant who fled; Evans later pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and admitted a supervised-release violation for the July possession.
- Probation alleged additional violations: (1) Evans committed aggravated assault by firing the weapon (July incident), and (2) Evans previously possessed a gun at his residence in April 2015; Evans denied both ancillary allegations.
- At sentencing the district court applied an aggravated-assault guideline enhancement (§§2A2.2(a), (b)(2)(A)), concluding Evans did not act in self-defense, and imposed 57 months on the felon-in-possession charge plus a consecutive 2-year term for the supervised-release violation.
- The court imposed multiple standard and special conditions of supervised release, including Special Condition 5 (barring any connection with the Down Below Gang) and Standard Conditions 4, 5, and 13 (family responsibilities; ‘‘work regularly’’; third‑party risk notification).
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit: affirmed the supervised-release revocation sentence, vacated the substantive felon-in-possession sentence in part to correct supervised-release conditions, upheld the aggravated‑assault enhancement, struck one sentence from Special Condition 5, and held three standard conditions unconstitutionally vague and remanded to modify them.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (United States) | Defendant's Argument (Evans) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §2A2.2 enhancement applies (aggravated assault for discharging firearm) | The video and circumstances show Evans used the firearm in aggravated assault; self‑defense is not supported | Evans says he acted in self‑defense; court misallocated burden of proof | Enhancement upheld; court’s finding that shooting a fleeing man was not reasonable self‑defense was not clearly erroneous and any burden error was harmless |
| Validity and scope of Special Condition 5 (no association with named gang; presumption clause) | Gang‑avoidance condition is reasonably related to sentencing goals given Evans’s affiliations; presumption supports enforcement | Condition is vague/overbroad and the presumption improperly eliminates mens rea requirement | Condition generally upheld as procedurally and substantively reasonable, but remanded to strike the final presumption sentence (which would negate mens rea) |
| Whether Standard Conditions 4, 5, and 13 are unconstitutionally vague | Gov: conditions are common‑sense, guided by probation officer and not vague in application | Evans: phrases (“meet other family responsibilities,” “work regularly,” “personal history or characteristics” / notify third parties) lack definite meaning, leaving him without fair notice | Court held all three standard conditions unconstitutionally vague as written and remanded to remove/clarify the ambiguous phrases (remove “meet other family responsibilities,” clarify “regularly,” and narrow/define third‑party notification) |
| Whether district court was required to resolve a factual dispute (April 2015 gun allegation) at the revocation hearing | Govt: no prejudicial error; even if Rule 32.1 lacks an exact analogue, any failure was harmless | Evans: Rule 32(i)(3)(B) requires resolving factual disputes or explicitly stating resolution unnecessary | Court declined to decide if Rule 32.1 requires explicit resolution but found any failure to resolve the April allegation harmless because sentence relied on admitted July violation and criminal history |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763 (9th Cir.) (standard of review for sentencing factual findings)
- United States v. Charlesworth, 217 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.) (preponderance standard at sentencing adjustments)
- United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. en banc) (procedural‑reasoned explanation requirement for sentencing)
- United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.) (standards for supervised‑release condition review)
- United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858 (9th Cir.) (construe gang‑association condition to require mens rea; incidental contact excluded)
- United States v. Vega, 545 F.3d 743 (9th Cir.) (presumption of mens rea when construing supervised‑release conditions)
- United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir.) (facial vagueness challenge to standard conditions)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (void‑for‑vagueness principles; no requirement of mathematical certainty)
- Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (limits on vagueness challenges; as‑applied focus)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (example of invalidated vague residual clause; guidance on vagueness analysis)