United States v. Anthony Burnett
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22662
| 3rd Cir. | 2014Background
- On March 29, 2011, Anthony Burnett and Raheem Hankerson robbed Poland Jewelers at gunpoint; they fled in a borrowed black Honda owned by Shavon Adams, abandoned it on a dead-end street, and left on foot. The trunk contained stolen jewelry, weapons, wigs, and items with DNA evidence linking Burnett and Hankerson.
- Police located the Honda nearby, towed it to a police garage, obtained a search warrant, and recovered the stolen items and DNA evidence. Hankerson pleaded guilty and cooperated; Burnett went to trial and was convicted on Hobbs Act robbery counts, a § 924(c) firearms count (brandishing), and related offenses.
- Burnett moved pretrial to suppress the vehicle search and a photographic identification; the district court denied suppression and later convicted him. He was sentenced to an aggregate 288 months (204 months on robbery counts, consecutive 84 months on § 924(c)).
- On appeal Burnett challenged: standing to suppress the Honda search (arguing he had abandoned the car so passenger-law didn’t apply), the photo array’s suggestiveness, sufficiency/indictment for § 924(c), the sufficiency of the evidence, classification as an Armed Career Criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and Eighth Amendment proportionality of his sentence.
- The Third Circuit affirmed: Burnett lacked standing to challenge the search, the photo array was not unduly suggestive, the § 924(c) indictment was sufficient, the evidence was overwhelming, the § 924(e) enhancement was lawful under Almendarez‑Torres precedent, and the within‑guideline sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Burnett) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge search of Honda | He had abandoned the car before police seized it, so passenger‑standing cases don’t apply and he retained a privacy interest in items he left in trunk | As a nonowner passenger who abandoned the vehicle, Burnett lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy; ownership/possession of items in the car does not create standing | Affirmed denial of suppression; Burnett lacked standing (passenger/abandonment forfeited any privacy interest) |
| Photographic identification suppression | Photo array was unduly suggestive because other photos didn’t sufficiently resemble him | Array members were reasonably comparable (age, race, facial hair, complexion); no substantial risk of misidentification | Affirmed denial of suppression; array not unnecessarily suggestive and no substantial likelihood of misidentification |
| Sufficiency/indictment for § 924(c) (in furtherance element) | Indictment failed to allege that use of the firearm was "in furtherance" of a crime of violence | § 924(c) has two prongs: (1) "use or carry" during and in relation to the crime, and (2) possession "in furtherance"; the indictment alleged use/brandishing sufficient for the first prong | Affirmed; indictment sufficient because it alleged use/brandishing "during and in relation to" the robbery (no "in furtherance" allegation required for the use/carry prong) |
| Sufficiency of the evidence | (Concisely asserted on appeal) Evidence was insufficient to support convictions | Government presented eyewitness IDs, co‑defendant testimony, security video, DNA matching gloves, and recovered stolen items | Affirmed; evidence overwhelming and sufficient to sustain convictions |
| Armed Career Criminal enhancement under § 924(e) / Alleyne challenge | Alleyne requires any fact that raises mandatory minimums be submitted to a jury, so prior convictions used to enhance his sentence should have been indicted/decided by jury | Almendarez‑Torres exception allows courts to find prior convictions for recidivist enhancements; Alleyne did not disturb that exception | Affirmed; prior‑conviction enhancement under § 924(e) is lawful and not barred by Alleyne |
| Eighth Amendment proportionality | 288‑month within‑guideline sentence is cruel and unusual (effectively life for his age) | Sentence is within the advisory Guidelines and proportional to violent, recidivist conduct; substantial deference to Congress and Guidelines | Affirmed; sentence not grossly disproportionate and thus not Eighth Amendment violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (plaintiff bears burden to show reasonable expectation of privacy to establish standing)
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (one has no Fourth Amendment standing solely through evidence seized from another's property)
- Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (to show subjective expectation of privacy, defendant must take normal precautions to maintain privacy)
- United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (possession of seized goods does not substitute for proof of a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched)
- Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (interpreting § 924(c) "use" to require active employment of the firearm)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact other than prior convictions that increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury)
- Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (facts that increase mandatory minimums must be submitted to a jury, but did not decide status of prior‑conviction exception)
- Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (suppression warranted where identification procedure is so suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of misidentification)
- Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (two‑part test for due‑process challenge to pretrial identification: undue suggestiveness and substantial risk of misidentification)