United States v. Anthony, 942 F.3d 955

In May–June 2014, R.W. (age 14) was trafficked and abused by William Johnson, who later pleaded guilty and was ordered to pay R.W. $900,000 in restitution.
In October 2014, Maurice Johnson and Tonya Gum operated a prostitution enterprise that trafficked minors R.W. and 15-year-old M.M.; the two girls generated about $40,000.
On October 24, 2014, Curtis Anthony contacted Gum’s escort line, met R.W. and M.M., paid for sexual services, and had sex with M.M.; he was later indicted and convicted of child-sex trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 1591) and conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1594).
The district court ordered Anthony to pay restitution of $327,013.50 to R.W. and $308,233.50 to M.M., including large awards for lifetime psychological treatment, and held the defendants jointly and severally liable.
On appeal Anthony argued (1) the restitution improperly compensated harms R.W. suffered during the earlier, unrelated William Johnson trafficking, and (2) restitution improperly covered losses from a broader three-week conspiracy charged in the indictment when the trial proof established only a smaller, one-time agreement involving Anthony.
The Tenth Circuit agreed that the restitution improperly included harms caused by William and vacated/remanded for recalculation limited to losses caused by Anthony’s offenses, but rejected plain-error relief for Anthony on his narrower-conspiracy argument (affirming that restitution may be based on the charged conspiracy as proved).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether restitution may include psychological harms that predate and were caused by an earlier, unrelated trafficker (William)	Anthony: restitution must be limited to losses he but-for caused; the award impermissibly includes William’s harms	Government: Anthony’s offenses independently caused plaintiff’s losses and entire liability may attach even if not sole cause	Court: Restitution must be limited to losses directly and proximately (but-for and proximate) caused by the defendant; district court erred by failing to disaggregate and must recalculate excluding harms attributable to William; vacated and remanded
Whether restitution liability for a conspiracy conviction should be measured by the broad conspiracy charged in the indictment or by the smaller conspiracy actually proved at trial (variance)	Anthony: proof established only a smaller, one-time agreement; restitution should be limited to harms from that proved conspiracy	Government: restitution can be imposed for losses from the charged conspiracy and joint-and-several liability is proper for scheme losses	Court: A variance occurred (trial proved a smaller conspiracy), but because Anthony forfeited this specific restitution challenge, plain-error review applies and he cannot show plain error; therefore the court did not reverse on this ground and left liability measured by the charged conspiracy as applied by the district court

Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) (Supreme Court limited §2259 relief in child‑pornography context; adopted a causation approach tied to defendant’s relative role in the causal process)
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (Supreme Court explained that language like "results from" ordinarily requires but‑for causation absent contrary textual/contextual indication)
United States v. Speakman, 594 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2010) (MVRA requires both but‑for and proximate causation for restitution)
United States v. Wells, 873 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2017) (applied Speakman’s direct‑and‑proximate causation standard to restitution questions)
United States v. Ferdman, 779 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2015) (restitution must be rooted in an actual‑loss calculation; courts may not rubber‑stamp undifferentiated victim claims)
United States v. Osborne, 332 F.3d 1307 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant convicted of conspiracy may be liable for losses proximately resulting from the conspiracy, including coconspirator conduct)
In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3d 59 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (discussed sufficient‑causation approach to joint liability for psychological harms; government relied on this authority but court found it inapposite)
United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (source for sufficient‑causation concept relied upon by some circuits)