United States v. Ansberry
976 F.3d 1108
| 10th Cir. | 2020Background
- In 2016 Ansberry built an HMTD-based explosive device, placed it in a duffel bag outside the Nederland, CO police station, and attempted to detonate it by calling/texting a phone trigger; the device failed to detonate during his attempts but was later discovered by officers.
- Bomb technicians later handled and rendered the device safe, ultimately detonating it in a controlled procedure; Ansberry was arrested and indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(2) for use/attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.
- At plea Ansberry admitted facts describing an attempted detonation against property and stated the device was not intended to cause mass casualties; he pled guilty without a plea agreement.
- At sentencing the government sought (1) a U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4(a)(1)(A) base level 24 (substantial risk of death/serious injury), (2) a § 3A1.2(a) three-level official-victim enhancement, and (3) a § 3A1.4 terrorism enhancement (retaliation against government conduct); the district court applied all three and imposed 324 months.
- On appeal the Tenth Circuit: affirmed application of § 2K1.4(a)(1)(A) (court’s finding that Ansberry actually created a substantial risk was not clearly erroneous); reversed the § 3A1.2(a) official‑victim enhancement (district court impermissibly relied on relevant conduct beyond facts immediately related to the offense of conviction); and vacated the § 3A1.4 terrorism enhancement because the court applied it without finding the retaliated‑against conduct was objectively government conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Ansberry) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2K1.4(a)(1)(A) (base level 24) applies because the offense created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury | The device and its components (HMTD, jar, shrapnel items, placement at police station) and expert testimony show Ansberry knowingly created an actual substantial risk | The device was incapable of detonating as designed (intact bulb) and was placed to avoid casualties; at plea he admitted device not intended for mass casualties | Affirmed — district court found Ansberry actually created a substantial risk and that factual finding was not clearly erroneous |
| Whether § 3A1.2(a) (official‑victim enhancement) applies because officers were targeted due to status | Officers who encountered the device (and those inside the station) were official victims because Ansberry placed the device at the police station and intended to target police | Ansberry pleaded to attempted use against property (not persons); enhancement must be based only on facts immediately related to the offense of conviction | Reversed — district court erred by relying on later relevant conduct; § 3A1.2(a) must be supported by facts immediately related to the offense of conviction |
| Whether § 3A1.4 (terrorism enhancement under §2332b(g)(5)) applies because offense was calculated to retaliate against government conduct | Ansberry acted to retaliate for the 1971 killing of his friend by a town marshal; his subjective intent to retaliate supports the enhancement | Retaliation must be directed at objectively government conduct (not merely conduct Ansberry subjectively believed to be government action) | Reversed — if enhancement is applied on retaliation ground, the court must find the retaliated‑against conduct is objectively government conduct |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Blackwell, 323 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2003) (§ 3A1.2(a) official‑victim enhancement limited to facts immediately related to the offense of conviction)
- United States v. Young, 893 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 2018) (§ 3C1.2 enhancement requires that the defendant actually created a substantial risk)
- United States v. Dillon, 351 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2003) (ultimate factual finding subsumes necessary predicate findings for risk determinations)
- United States v. Honeycutt, 8 F.3d 785 (11th Cir. 1993) (state of mind and fortuity considerations in assessing explosives risk)
- United States v. Wright, 747 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2014) ("calculated" imposes a planning/specific‑intent element for terrorism enhancement)
- United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 2012) (interpretation of § 2332b(g)(5) requiring purpose to influence/retaliate)
- United States v. Salim, 549 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2008) (judicial rulings constitute government conduct for § 2332b purposes)
- United States v. Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2004) (terrorism enhancement focuses on defendant's purpose; ability to carry out plan is not dispositive)