Lead Opinion
COLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court with regard to Defendants Wright, Baxter, and Stevens, in which CLAY, J., and BERTELSMAN, D.J., concurred. CLAY, J. (pp. 417-19), delivered the opinion of the court with regard to Defendant Hayne, in which BERTELSMAN, D.J., concurred.
OPINION
In April 2012, Defendants-Appellants Douglas Wright, Brandon Baxter, Connor Stevens, and Anthony Hayne were arrested after they placed explosives at the base of a bridge along Route 82 in Brecksville, Ohio, and attempted to detonate them. Unbeknownst to the defendants, the explosives were inert, and one of their co-conspirators was in fact an FBI informant. All four defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(2)(B) & (D), attempt to use a weapon of mass destruction, § 2332a(a)(2)(B) & (D), and aiding and abetting in malicious use of explosives to destroy a structure used in interstate commerce, § 844(i). The district court applied a 12-level terrorism enhancement to each defendant’s sentence, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4.
All four defendants now challenge the application of the terrorism enhancement, which requires that the offense be “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A). Additionally, Wright challenges his enhancement for leadership under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c), Baxter challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, and Stevens challenges both the procedural and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, including the length of his supervised release. We unanimously affirm the sentences of Wright, Baxter, and Stevens. Judges Glay and Bertelsman also affirm Hayne’s sentence, whereas Judge Cole would vacate Hayne’s sentence and remand for resentencing. Therefore, this opinion is the opinion of the court except as to section II.A.3.
I. OVERVIEW
A. Factual Background
The following is a summary of the key facts pertinent to this appeal. Although the district court engaged in extensive fact-finding through briefing and held a hearing on sentencing matters, some facts remained in dispute when the judgments were entered. The following summary makes note of these disputes only if they may be relevant to resolving the issues on appeal.
In the fall of 2011, Wright, Baxter, Stevens, and Hayne were involved to varying extents with the Occupy Cleveland movement (“Occupy”), a loose-knit political group protesting economic inequality. Some individuals affiliated with Occupy, including the four defendants, briefly
Wright and the CHS had intermittent contact that fall, during which time Wright discussed his interest in escalating his political activities from protesting to more disruptive actions. The CHS offered Wright and Baxter occasional odd jobs and paid them for their work. He then had little contact with Wright and Baxter from November 2011 until February 15, 2012, when Wright and the CHS met to discuss plans to protest during an upcoming NATO/G8 summit in Chicago and considered obtaining riot gear to use there. According to Wright, the CHS gave him $200 to purchase the gear and offered to arrange the sale. Wright, Baxter, and the CHS met again a few days later and discussed the possibility of using stink bombs, explosives, or paint guns in various locations, including the casino in downtown Cleveland. At this point, the FBI decided to begin recording conversations between the CHS and the defendants.
The next significant conversation between the CHS, Wright, and Baxter occurred on March 28, when they met to arrange the sale of riot gear from the CHS’s contact. The conversation on this date was lengthy. In relevant portions, the three discussed participating in a “black block” protest group in Chicago for the purposes of assaulting police officers and protecting other non-violent protestors from police aggression. As they drove, the men discussed the possibility of “taking out a bridge,” and Wright observed of a particular structure, “this would be a good one.... ” Baxter noted that if they were to attack a bridge, the government would respond by placing “security on almost every bridge in the entire [expletive] country.” He also raised concerns that attacking a bridge might result in casualties. On that day, the CHS created a recording of Wright and Baxter agreeing to purchase retractable batons and gas masks through the CHS’s contact — actually an undercover FBI agent.
Wright, Baxter, the CHS, and, on some occasions, Stevens, met several times in late March and early April. During this period, the group decided to obtain explosives for use in an undetermined scheme, though precisely how this decision was reached remains in dispute. The defendants recount that the CHS relentlessly prodded the group to purchase explosives, until they eventually acquiesced. Nevertheless, Wright’s presentence investigation report (“PSR”) indicates that, in March, “the idea of obtaining C-4 explosives was brought up,” and Wright agreed to participate in a sale of the explosives on April 1, 2012, although he had previously refused to commit to the purchase. Wright did not contest this characterization of the facts in his memorandum objecting to portions of his PSR.
On April 7, the CHS, Wright, Baxter, and Stevens met and discussed, in a noncommittal manner, several potential targets for attack, including a bridge in the Flats area of Cleveland and the Federal Reserve, Fusion Center, and Justice Center buildings downtown. Wright suggested submerging explosives in the Cuyahoga River and then detonating them as cargo ships passed by. He asked the group if it could reach a “consensus” on his plan.
Eventually, the decision was made to use the explosives at the base of the Route 82 bridge in Brecksville, part of the Ohio
The group obtained the explosives on April 29, when the CHS picked up Wright, Stevens, Baxter, and a new companion, Anthony Hayne, and drove them to a motel to meet an undercover FBI agent posing as an arms dealer. (Hayne had been in contact with Wright, Baxter, and Stevens in October of 2011 and claims that Wright suggested that they engage in violent acts at that time. However, Hayne was not drawn into the bridge-bombing plot until April 29.) At the motel, the agent delivered the group two inert C-4 explosive devices, as well as the riot gear that Wright and Baxter had previously ordered, and showed the group how to detonate the devices using a cellular phone. The next day, Wright, Baxter, Stevens, Hayne, the CHS, and a sixth individual named Joshua Stafford drove to the area under the bridge, placed the explosives at the base of a support column, and then absconded to a nearby restaurant, where they attempted to detonate the bombs. According to a contested report prepared by the defendants’ explosives expert, even if the C-4 had not been inert, the group had used too little of it to cause anything more than minor damage to the bridge’s support piers.
B. Procedural History
Wright, Baxter, Stevens, and Hayne were indicted on May 3, 2012, on three charges: conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction and attempt to use a weapon of mass destruction, both in violation of § 2332a(a)(2)(B) & (D); and aiding and abetting in malicious use of explosives to destroy a structure used in interstate commerce, in violation of § 844(i). The defendants originally pleaded not guilty. However, Hayne entered a change of plea to guilty on July 25, 2012, and subsequently cooperated with prosecutors. On October 21, Wright, Baxter, and Stevens changed their pleas to guilty on all three counts. As the district court indicated, the defendants opted to plead guilty at least in part because they believed that Hayne’s testimony effectively contradicted an entrapment defense.
The PSRs of all four defendants calculated their base offense levels as 24 and added 12 levels for the terrorism enhancement. Additionally, the PSRs recommended a 2-level leadership enhancement for Wright and a 2-level decrease for both Baxter’s and Stevens’s acceptance of responsibility. Before the sentencing hearings took place, the district court considered various memoranda from the defendants objecting to material in their PSRs and arguing that the terrorism enhancement should not apply, among other matters. The district court also held a hearing pertaining to the terrorism enhancement and issued a memorandum opinion and order explaining that the enhancement would be applied to Wright, Baxter, and Stevens. These three defendants were sentenced on November 20, 2012.
Hayne’s sentencing occurred several days after his co-conspirators’. The court’s memorandum regarding the terrorism enhancement did not contain findings
Ultimately, the district court chose to apply substantial downward variances to all defendants’ sentences pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In a memorandum issued after the sentencing hearings concluded, the court explained that it had opted to vary downward on the basis of the inert nature of the explosives, the CHS’s role in facilitating the offense, and various individual characteristics of the defendants. Wright was sentenced to 138 months in prison for each offense, significantly below the guidelines range, which the court calculated as 324 to 405 months. Baxter received a sentence of 117 months and Stevens 97 months, also well under the court’s guidelines calculations of 262 to 327 months and 188 to 235 months, respectively. At Hayne’s hearing, the court acknowledged that a 60-month minimum applied and sentenced Hayne to 72 months, down from a guidelines range of 262 to 327 months. All sentences were concurrent, and all defendants were also sentenced to lifetime supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583©; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(l).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Terrorism Enhancement Under § 3A1.4
Section 3A1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines authorizes a 12-level enhancement for “a felony that involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism.” To define the phrase “federal crime of terrorism,” the guidelines provision directs us to 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). See § 3A1.4, cmt. n. 1. Section 2332b(g)(5) sets forth two requirements for an offense to be considered a federal crime of terrorism: first, the offense must be “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct,” and second, the underlying act must be included within an enumerated list of eligible offenses. This list includes violations of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (arson and bombing of property used in interstate commerce) and § 2332a (use of weapons of mass destruction). 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i).
In order for the sentencing court to apply a terrorism enhancement, the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the two requirements of § 2332b have been met. See United States v. Layne,
We review the district court’s legal interpretation of the terrorism enhancement de novo, and we review its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Fore,
1. Section 2332b(g)(5) Intent Requirement
The defendants do not dispute that they were charged with offenses making them eligible for the terrorism enhancement. Rather, they argue that the government has not met its burden of showing that they intended “to influence or affect the conduct of government” or “retaliate against government conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A). Specifically, the defendants contend that they, as members of the Occupy movement, sought to influence corporate behavior or disrupt the lives of the “one percent” but did not target the government specifically.
This court has not yet addressed in detail the meaning of the phrase “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government.”
A defendant has the requisite intent if he or she acted with the purpose of influencing or affecting government conduct and planned his or her actions with this objective in mind. Siddiqui,
Furthermore, specific intent may be found even if the record does not contain direct evidence of the defendant’s particular frame of mind. See United States v. Dye,
Our sister circuits have upheld application of the terrorism enhancement to defendants who sought to bomb or otherwise violently target government facilities. See, e.g., United States v. McDavid,
With these background principles in mind, we turn to the individual defendants to assess whether the district court properly determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the intent requirement was satisfied.
2. Wright, Baxter, and Stevens
The defendants challenge the factual basis for applying the terrorism enhancement. The district court held that the facts as set forth in the government’s sentencing memorandum “clearly establish[ ], by a preponderance of the evidence, that the terrorism enhancement applies” to Wright, Baxter, and Stevens. It reached this conclusion after holding a hearing regarding the enhancement, at which both sides presented evidence and argument.
We review the facts relied upon by the district court and also look to the record as a whole to determine whether the court committed clear error. See United States v. Herrera,
Second, Wright and Baxter expressed interest in participating in a “black block” — which Wright defined as “a group of people that basically beat the [expletive] outta the cops and keep the non-violent protestors from getting beat the [expletive] up by cops” — at the protests to be held during the NATO and G8 summits in Chicago in May 2012. (Tr. 1D6, R. 184-1, PagelD 2679.) Wright and Baxter also arranged to purchase gas masks, retractable batons, and canisters of tear gas for use at the Chicago protests or elsewhere.
Third, Wright, Stevens, and Baxter participated in at least one recorded conversation addressing the feasibility of using explosives in or immediately outside government buildings. Wright suggested placing explosives outside of the Federal Reserve building in Cleveland in order to blow up part of the building. Baxter suggested targeting the Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center, to which Stevens
Fourth, there is evidence to indicate that all three defendants viewed the bombing as a terrorist act, or at a minimum expected that it would be perceived as such. Baxter and Stevens acknowledged that a bridge bombing would likely affect the conduct of government agencies by prompting them to take heightened security measures:
Baxter: You know that ... if this is some ... this happens they’re gonna make security on almost every bridge in the entire [expletive] country.
CHS: Yeah.
Wright: No, just the important ones. The really important ones. But I mean, they got the Detroit [Avenue] bridge that would kill a bunch of people.
(Tr. 1D6, R.184-1, PagelD 2688.) Both Wright and Baxter also observed that they expected to be sent to Guantanamo Bay if their bombing scheme was discovered. Additionally, after the defendants had placed the inert explosives at the base of the bridge, Stevens commented that they had “just committed the biggest act of, only act of terrorism, that I know [of] in Cleveland since the 1960’s.” Stevens further characterized the bridge-bombing attempt as a “nice learning experience” for “testing” the capacities of the explosive devices the group had planted or the feasibility of future actions. (Tr. 1D33, R. 184-7, PageID 2820, 2830-31.)
Viewing this evidence cumulatively, we conclude that it is sufficient to support the district court’s application of the terrorist enhancement, even though none of the above facts alone would necessarily be sufficient. The evidence demonstrates that Wright, Baxter, and Stevens undertook the bridge-bombing plot within a context of plans that they understood to implicate government interests. They intended to engage in violent protests in Chicago, which — to their minds, at least — would likely involve combat with law enforcement officers. They considered using explosives to damage two government buildings, although they did not follow through. They expected that the government would respond to the bridge bombing — that the bombing would “influence or affect” the government — by taking new security measures. These conversations establish that Wright, Baxter, and Stevens were aware of the consequences of their acts and chose to act in ways that would bring about those consequences, even if they had other goals in mind, such as antagonizing the “one percent.” The district court did not err in applying the enhancement.
S. Hayne
We have reason to consider Hayne’s case separately. First, as a latecomer to the conspiracy, Hayne did not participate in the conversations evincing an intent to affect the conduct of the government. Second, the district court did not explicitly identify the facts upon which it based Hayne’s enhancement for terrorism, other than to indicate at his sentencing hearing that it had considered the question “at great length” in determining the sentences of Wright, Baxter, and Stevens. Because I believe that the district court did not adequately explain its basis for applying the enhancement to Hayne, I would vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
I first look to the record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence of Hayne’s intent. Because Hayne was not a
Hayne testified that he met Wright in October 2011, that they temporarily lived in an abandoned church together, and that Wright demonstrated an interest in explosives and was considering . setting off bombs in the church building. He also recounted that Wright had asked him if he knew where to obtain explosives. In early November, Hayne was arrested on charges unrelated to this case and remained in jail until January 3, 2012. As a result, he lost contact with Wright and the others. When Hayne reconnected with Wright and Baxter in March, he learned that they had some sort of violent plan and that they had scoped out an undisclosed location. But Hayne testified that he did not know any details of the bombing plot until Wright informed him on April 29, the day before the attempted detonation.
Hayne’s testimony alone is not sufficient to establish that he understood the bridge bombing as part of a plot intended to affect or disrupt the government. On direct examination, Hayne explained that he believed the purpose of the scheme to be to “stop the transportation of the [one] percent.” He also made a similar claim in a signed statement to the FBI shortly after his arrest, in which explained that he understood the bombing to have “something to do with May Day, like the general strike and stopping people from going to work and something like that.” (Mot. Hr’g, R. 179, PagelD 2459, 2464-65.) The district court did not explicitly discredit this testimony, though, if it had, we would show deference to such a credibility determination. See Esteppe,
In light of this evidence, it is not clear how the district court arrived at its conclusion that Hayne possessed the -necessary intent. The court might have inferred such intent from the offense itself, might have discredited Hayne’s testimony regarding his motives and limited knowledge of the plot, or might have imputed to Hayne the intent of his co-conspirators. See U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(l)(B) (“relevant conduct” guideline); but see Stewart,
A court commits procedural error if it fails to adequately explain a chosen sentence. Gall v. United States,
B. Wright’s Leadership Enhancement Under § 3Bl.l(c)
Wright appeals the district court’s 2-level enhancement for his role in the offense as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of criminal activity. U.S.S.G.
At sentencing, Wright objected generally to the facts contained in the final PSR and to the leadership enhancement. . He now contends that the PSR contained three key inaccuracies: (1) that Wright had recruited the other defendants into the conspiracy and initiated contact with the CHS, (2) that Wright was the first person to mention making plastic explosives, and (3) that Wright chose the bridge as the group’s target “after doing independent research.” Wright further argues that the only true leader of the conspiracy was the CHS, as he arranged the sale of riot gear and explosives, provided transportation to the defendants, and consistently encouraged them to pursue the bridge-bombing scheme.
We review for clear error the district court’s factual determinations pertaining to the leadership enhancement. See United States v. McDaniel,
To receive an enhancement for one’s role in the offense, a defendant “must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 2. To determine whether a defendant’s involvement qualifies, courts are to consider “the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, ... the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others.” Id. at cmt. n. 4. More than one person may qualify as a leader or organizer. Id. However, “[mjerely playing an essential role in the offense is not equivalent to exercising managerial control over other participants.” Vandeberg,
Despite the existence of some disputed facts regarding Wright’s role in the offense, our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district court did not erroneously apply the leadership enhancement. Hayne testified under oath that Wright had introduced him to the CHS, spoke with him about obtaining explosives in November of 2011, and told him about the plan to place the explosives beneath the Route 82 bridge. At the same hearing, Baxter testified that Wright had encouraged the group to come to a “consensus” on their plan — which consisted, at the time, of targeting a cargo ship by placing C-4 underwater and detonating it as a ship approached. Although Wright’s plan was not carried out, this evidence supports the district court’s interpretation that Wright acted as coordinator and sought the participation and agreement of the others. Additionally, an FBI agent working with the CHS testified that Wright suggested that
Wright’s main arguments against the application of the leadership enhancement are largely beside the point. Although the CHS’s involvement may have been equal to, or even greater than, Wright’s, a defendant does not need to have been the sole leader to qualify for an enhancement. See United States v. Vasquez,
C. Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness
Baxter and Stevens challenge the procedural reasonableness of their sentences, and Stevens also claims that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we use a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Alexander,
If we are satisfied that a sentence. is procedurally reasonable, we may then consider its substantive reasonableness. This court finds a sentence substantively unreasonable “if the district court selects a sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant sentencing factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United States v. Camiscione,
If a party fails to object to a perceived error at sentencing after being afforded the opportunity to do so, we review the claim for plain error only. To prevail, then, the party must demonstrate that the district court committed a clear or obvious error that affected his substantial rights as well as the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 386.
Baxter argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to address various objections he raised to purported inaccuracies in his PSR. He claims that correction of these errors would have led the district court to determine that the terrorism enhancement did not apply. Specifically, Baxter objected that the PSR incorrectly identified March 28, 2012, as the date when the group decided to target a bridge and erroneously described him as “the first person to mention blowing up a bridge.” He further objected that the PSR omitted facts demonstrating that the CHS badgered Baxter into agreeing to the purchase of C-4 explosives, that the CHS ultimately selected the bridge as the target, and that Baxter was not involved in the decision to use the C-4 on the Route 82 bridge but went along with the plan that others had concocted. Lastly, he objected to the PSR’s determination that the government was the intended victim of the bombing scheme. Baxter addressed the alleged discrepancies in a memorandum filed within fourteen days of receiving the PSR. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(f)(1). He also raised the same objections at sentencing, to which the court replied, “Very well. Those objections have been considered and are denied.”
Baxter further claims that the court failed to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B), which states, “[a]t sentencing, the court: ... must — for any disputed portion of the pre-sentence report or other controverted matter — rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” Rule 32 requires a defendant to raise his objections during the sentencing hearing. United States v. White,
We first address Baxter’s argument that the court failed to resolve factual disputes regarding the CHS’s role in facilitating the offense. This claim fails for two reasons: first, the court heard testimony and argument regarding the CHS’s conduct at a hearing that took place before sentencing, and second, the court repeatedly stated that it did not believe the CHS to be responsible for the defendants’ actions, particularly in light of their decision to plead guilty. At the aforementioned hearing, the court responded to a line of questioning regarding the CHS’s role by observing that the defendants “did not follow the defense of entrapment” and then commented that the case “[was] not about the CHS’s record.” Nevertheless, the court explicitly cited the CHS’s conduct in explaining its decision to grant Baxter a substantial downward departure from the guidelines range. The record,
Baxter also objected to various characterizations of his own role in the plot, specifically his contributions to the group’s decision to acquire C-4 explosives and to target the Route 82 bridge. Baxter correctly notes that the court did not issue particular findings or rulings on these factual disputes. It did not reach a clear determination as to who first suggested purchasing explosives or planting them under the bridge, or when exactly these decisions were made, as its recitation of the facts in Baxter’s sentencing memorandum illustrates. The court may have determined that these objections were irrelevant — for example, that enough evidence existed of Baxter’s intent irrespective of the disputed facts — but it neglected to say as much.
Nevertheless, the court’s error was harmless. See Quail,
As for Baxter’s last objection — to the PSR’s characterization of the government as the offense’s victim — we find that the court adequately addressed this matter by holding a hearing regarding the terrorism enhancement and by issuing a 36-page memorandum opinion concluding that both the law and the facts supported its application. Rule 32 serves to ensure that a court does not “summarily adopt the factual findings in the PSR or simply declare that the facts are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” Vanhoose,
2. Stevens’s Claim of Procedural and Substantive Unreasonableness
Stevens claims that the district court improperly calculated his sentence and erroneously applied the terrorism enhancement, resulting in a procedurally and substantively unreasonable sentence. Stevens’s first argument appears to be simply that the district court improperly calculated his sentence because it did not impose only the 60-month minimum required by 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Stevens does not argue that the district court failed to account for the § 3553(a) factors or based the sentence on erroneous facts. See Gall,
Next, Stevens contends that his sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable because the court failed to explain its decision to impose lifetime supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583© (“[T]he authorized term of supervised release for any offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) is any term of years or life.”); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(l) (authorizing term of supervised release “up to life” for “any offense listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), the commission of which resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of, death or serious bodily injury to another person.”). Stevens further suggests that the district court may have believed lifetime supervised release to be mandatory. We reject this argument, noting that at Baxter’s sentencing hearing, held only hours before Stevens’s, the court indicated that it had discretion to impose the lifetime term.
Turning to the sufficiency of the district court’s reasoning, at sentencing, Stevens’s attorney asked the judge “to consider not imposing” lifetime supervision. When the court did in fact impose the lifetime term, Stevens’s attorney made a general objection to his client’s sentence but did not specifically challenge the imposition of lifetime supervised release. However, the district court appeared to invite a general objection, as it asked Stevens’s attorney whether there was “anything further [he] want[ed] to put on the record” and then immediately followed this question by stating, “You can object to all my findings and keep that in the record.” At this point, counsel responded, “I’ll just state for the record I object.”
Assuming that this objection is sufficient, the district court did not abuse its discretion, much less plainly err, in assigning Stevens lifetime supervised release. Although the court did not explain its reasoning for the term of supervised release at sentencing, it filed an 18-page memorandum opinion the following day in which it enumerated and considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See United States v. Rossi,
Finally, Stevens claims that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the court impermissibly considered the length of supervised release in determining its downward variance. For support, Stevens cites United States v. Johnson, in which the Supreme Court held that excess time served in prison cannot be applied to reduce one’s term of supervised release.
III. CONCLUSION
The sentences of Wright, Baxter, and Stevens are affirmed. For the reasons addressed in Judge Clay’s opinion, the court also affirms Hayne’s sentence.
OPINION
Notes
. The following Sixth Circuit cases address the terrorism enhancement generally: United States v. Dye,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and announcing the judgment as to Defendant ANTHONY HAYNE.
I agree with Judge Cole that Defendants Wright, Baxter, and Stevens qualify for the terrorism enhancement of U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4, and I concur in affirming their sentences. Furthermore, the district court did not err in applying the terrorism enhancement to Defendant Hayne. We therefore AFFIRM his sentence as well.
Hayne met Wright six months before the attempted bombing of the Route 82 bridge. Within a few weeks of meeting, Wright was telling Hayne about plans to bomb buildings and bridges. For one of these plots, Wright discussed “creating a distraction on the Detroit-Superior Memorial Bridge in order to draw police from downtown Cleveland, and then, in the absence of police, committing violent acts.” (R. 228, Hayne Sentencing Op., at 3392-93.) Hayne thought these plots were “kind of cool.” (R. 179, Sentencing Hrg. Tr., at 2455.) In early November 2011, Wright asked Hayne if he knew how to procure explosives. At around the same time, Hayne was building and detonating smoke bombs — something Wright derided as “pussy shit.” (Id. at 2457.) Wright and Baxter told Hayne just a month before the bombing about another plot they had in the works, albeit in vague terms.
On April 29, 2013, Hayne accompanied Wright, Baxter, and the “confidential human source” to a hotel room where they purchased two bombs from what turned out to be an undercover FBI agent. But the agent delivered more than bombs — he also gave the group ballistic vests, smoke grenades, and gas masks that Wright and Baxter had previously ordered. The next day, Hayne acted as lookout while his co-defendants planted the bombs on a support column of the Route 82 bridge. Once the devices had been planted, Stevens told the others “This is the biggest act of terrorism in Cleveland since the 1960s.” (Hayne Sentencing Op. at 3394.) Hayne and his codefendants then drove to an Applebee’s and attempted to blow up the bridge.
The first category in § 3A1.4 is applicable to cases like the one before us now— cases where the crimes of conviction are found among the enumerated terrorism offenses of 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B). See United States v. Graham,
The specific intent standard we announce today is a legal issue concerning the proper construction of the Guideline and the statute. However, whether a defendant “actually harbored such an intent is a question of fact.” United States v. Reaume,
Hayne is correct that he came into the plot to blow up the Route 82 bridge relatively late in the day. But the record shows Hayne knew that this bombing was part of a larger scheme, of which Wright was the mastermind. Wright had told Hayne about plans to bomb other major pieces of infrastructure. Hayne saw the undercover agent deliver gear that would be used for future acts of terrorist violence — not the Route 82 bridge bombing. Hayne testified that the goal of destroying the Route 82 bridge was to “[s]top the transportation of the 1 percent” (Sentencing Hrg. Tr. at 2459), but the coconspira-tors did not choose to spark class conflict by attacking a private installation. Cf. United States v. Tankersley,
For these reasons, the district court’s sentence of Hayne is AFFIRMED.
