United States v. Angel Ivostraza-Torres
16-4442
| 3rd Cir. | Nov 17, 2017Background
- Angel Catalino Ivostraza-Torres pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute ≥500g of cocaine and was sentenced to 204 months imprisonment and 8 years supervised release.
- He was designated a career offender, which produced a Guidelines range of 262–327 months; the court granted a downward variance to 204 months.
- The District Court orally imposed standard supervised-release conditions and filed the AO form listing thirteen standard conditions; Standard Condition 4 included the language that the defendant will “support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities.”
- The AO had updated the standard form about a month before sentencing to remove that language, and the Seventh Circuit had held similar language vague and overbroad.
- Ivostraza-Torres appealed, arguing the inclusion of the impermissible language required vacatur and full resentencing so the court could reconsider the prison term in light of a proper financial-support condition.
- The Government conceded the condition was error and sought a limited remand to remove the offending language; the Third Circuit agreed a limited remand was appropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the inclusion of “meet other family responsibilities” in Standard Condition 4 requires vacatur and full resentencing | Ivostraza‑Torres: the impermissible condition is vague/overbroad and may have affected the overall sentence; remand for full resentencing needed to permit a meaningful financial-support condition | Government: concession that the language was erroneous but argues only a limited remand to correct the form condition is necessary | Court: limited remand ordering deletion of the offending language; full de novo resentencing not warranted |
| Whether erroneous supervised‑release language here altered offense level, Guidelines range, or sentence | Ivostraza‑Torres: cross‑cutting effects between supervised‑release conditions and prison term could justify reconsideration of sentence | Government: no plausible effect on offense level, Guidelines, or term of imprisonment | Court: no record showing any effect; sentence remains intact |
| Standard for remand when supervised‑release condition is facially invalid | Ivostraza‑Torres: urges broader (Seventh Circuit) standard that possible reconsideration merits full resentencing | Government: follow Third Circuit practice of limited remand to reformulate/eliminate defective conditions | Court: adopts limited‑remand approach consistent with Third Circuit precedents |
| Whether resentencing is required under Ciavarella when a sentencing error concerns supervised‑release conditions | Ivostraza‑Torres: argues Ciavarella supports de novo resentencing | Government: Ciavarella applies when vacation affects offense level/Guidelines/aggregate sentence, not isolated supervised‑release wording | Court: Ciavarella standard not met; no de novo resentencing required |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Guidry, 817 F.3d 997 (7th Cir.) (concerning vagueness/overbreadth of family‑support language in standard condition)
- United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing interplay of supervised‑release conditions and prison term)
- United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 2013) (de novo resentencing required when vacation affects offense level, Guidelines range, or aggregate sentence)
- United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2010) (remand to district court to eliminate or reformulate erroneous supervised‑release conditions)
- United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015) (Seventh Circuit standard advocating resentencing when reconsideration of a condition may conceivably induce a change in prison sentence)
- United States v. Anglin, 846 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2017) (ordered limited remand to clarify supervised‑release conditions)
- United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 2005) (Department of Justice policies do not create enforceable rights for defendants)
