United States v. Andre Staggers, 961 F.3d 745

Background

DEA wiretapped suspects and executed search warrants on Feb. 25, 2016; agents seized large quantities of heroin, firearms, cash, mail linking locations to Staggers and Session, and heroin/cocaine at a stash house with items linking Session.
Agents conducted a warrantless early-morning entry into Morrison’s home; officers say Morrison (or his girlfriend) consented and Morrison led them to a partially loaded firearm; Jupiter (girlfriend) testified officers barged in and later said they threatened to take the children if Morrison refused to sign consent.
Indictment charged all three with drug conspiracy and § 922(g)(1) firearms offenses; jury convicted Staggers and Session of the conspiracy (special verdict that they knew or reasonably should have known >=1 kg heroin), convicted all three of § 922(g)(1); Morrison acquitted of conspiracy.
Staggers and Session were sentenced to life under the pre–First Step Act mandatory minimum for 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A); several weeks later Congress enacted the First Step Act, which reduced the mandatory minimum to 25 years for similarly situated defendants.
Defendants appealed: Staggers and Session argued the First Step Act applies to pending cases; Staggers and Morrison raised Rehaif-based challenges to § 922(g)(1) convictions; Morrison moved to suppress evidence from the warrantless entry; Session challenged admission of DEA agent lay-opinion testimony and sufficiency of quantity evidence.
Fifth Circuit affirmed as to Staggers and Session in all respects, vacated Morrison’s § 922(g)(1) conviction and sentence and remanded for further findings on consent to enter (suppression), while otherwise affirming convictions and sentences.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether First Step Act §401(c) applies to defendants whose sentences were imposed before Act’s enactment	Staggers/Session: Act applies to any nonfinal cases pending on enactment, so they should be resentenced under reduced minima	Government: §401(c) applies only where sentence had not yet been imposed on enactment; sentences here were pronounced before enactment	Held: Sentence is "imposed" when pronounced; First Step Act inapplicable because both were sentenced before enactment; affirm life sentences.
Whether Rehaif requires reversal of §922(g)(1) convictions for failure to instruct jury on knowledge-of-felon-status	Staggers/Morrison: Rehaif makes knowledge of felon status an element; omission is plain error and undermines convictions	Government: Error conceded but reversible only if affecting substantial rights; sufficiency and contexts differ by defendant	Held: For Staggers, evidence (404(b) priors) cured error; for Morrison, the record outside the jury is sufficient and discretion to correct is declined; convictions nonetheless supported by sufficient evidence.
Whether warrantless entry of Morrison’s home was consensual and evidence should be suppressed	Morrison: Entry was forcible, consent coerced/invalid; district court erred by failing to resolve credibility and by treating silence/inaction as consent	Government: Jupiter implicitly consented and consent was voluntary and she had authority as co-resident	Held: District court erred by not resolving disputed factual issue whether Jupiter moved door to permit entry; voluntariness and authority findings not clearly erroneous but remand required for factual findings on consent.
Whether Agent Morris’s lay-opinion testimony and other evidence sufficed to prove Session knew or should have known ≥1 kg heroin	Session: Agent’s codeword testimony exceeded lay-opinion bounds and was essential to the 1 kg finding; without it evidence insufficient	Government: Agent had extensive case-specific foundation; other physical/electronic evidence independently supports quantity finding	Held: Even if some testimony exceeded bounds, any error was harmless because overwhelming independent evidence supported quantity; sufficiency affirmed.

Key Cases Cited

Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605 (common-law rule on abatement of prosecutions and effect of statute changes)
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (knowledge of felon status is element of § 922(g) offense)
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (plain-error discretionary relief standard)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for legal sufficiency of evidence)
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (apparent authority for third-party consent)
United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713 (5th Cir. rule on agents’ opinion/codeword testimony)
United States v. Richardson, 948 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. construing "sentence imposed" for First Step Act purposes)