United States v. Ama, 684 F. App'x 736

Background

In 2011 Ama pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm; base statutory maximum is 10 years (18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)).
The PSR classified Ama as an Armed Career Criminal under the ACCA based on three prior convictions, producing a 15‑year mandatory minimum; Ama was sentenced to 180 months.
The three prior convictions included: assault by a prisoner (Utah), attempted robbery (Utah), and assault on a federal employee under 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
After Johnson v. United States (Johnson II) invalidated the ACCA residual clause, Ama filed a § 2255 claiming he no longer qualified as an armed career criminal; the district court ultimately denied relief, finding his three priors were violent felonies.
On appeal the Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the § 111 conviction (and thus the three priors) qualified as an ACCA "violent felony" under the ACCA physical‑force clause.
The court concluded Ama’s § 111(a) felony conviction did not necessarily require the degree of "physical force" (i.e., violent force) required by Johnson I and therefore vacated and remanded for resentencing under the 10‑year statutory maximum.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Ama’s § 111 conviction is a violent felony under the ACCA physical‑force clause	Ama: § 111(a) does not require "violent force" and thus is not a violent felony post‑Johnson	Government: § 111(a) is divisible or necessarily requires "forcible" (violent) conduct and thus qualifies	Held: § 111(a) is not divisible into violent/nonviolent elements; "forcibly" can encompass non‑violent contact, so § 111(a) is not categorically a violent felony
Whether the modified categorical approach can be used to identify the means under § 111(a)	Ama: Mathis bars use of the modified categorical approach where statute lists means, not elements	Government: Modified categorical approach applies to determine which subsection/means was convicted	Held: Mathis controls; the alternatives in § 111(a)(1) are means (not elements), so the modified categorical approach cannot be used to pick which means were used
Whether "forcibly" as used in § 111(a) equals the ACCA's required "physical force"	Ama: "Forcibly" can include minor/non‑violent contact and thus falls short of Johnson I’s "violent force" requirement	Government: "Forcibly" modifies all verbs and demands force sufficient to qualify as violent force	Held: "Forcibly" may include mere contact (spitting, bumping, etc.); such force can be non‑violent under Johnson I, so § 111(a) does not necessarily meet the ACCA physical‑force definition
Remedy if § 111(a) not a violent felony	Ama: Vacate ACCA enhancement and resentence under 10‑year maximum	Government: ACCA enhancement still applies (court did not reach alternative priors)	Held: Because § 111(a) is not a violent felony, Ama lacks three qualifying priors; vacate sentence and remand for resentencing under the 10‑year statutory maximum

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" means violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (categorical approach; modified categorical approach only for divisible statutes)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishes elements from means; limits use of the modified categorical approach)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (realistic probability standard for categorical analysis)
United States v. Hathaway, 318 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 2003) (recognizes multiple offenses under § 111 and that actual physical contact supports felony § 111 conviction)
United States v. Romero‑Hernandez, 505 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2007) ("forcible" can include minor contact; analysis of crime of violence definition)
United States v. Dominguez‑Maroyoqui, 748 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2014) (§ 111 may not require "violent force" for ACCA purposes)
United States v. Ridens, 792 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2015) (de novo review of whether a prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA violent felony)