975 F.3d 1185
11th Cir.2020Background
- Boyd pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to a written plea agreement that included a broad sentence-appeal waiver except if the district court imposed a sentence that "exceeds the advisory guideline range."
- The plea agreement stated the district court would determine the advisory guideline range after the PSI, and any estimates from counsel, the government, or probation were non-binding. Boyd initialed and signed the agreement and confirmed at a Rule 11 colloquy that he understood the waiver.
- The probation office calculated a base offense level of 25 (U.S.S.G. §2K2.1) based on a prior 1999 Georgia conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, yielding a guideline range of 110–120 months (criminal-history category VI).
- Boyd objected, arguing his prior Georgia conviction was categorically overbroad and thus not a qualifying controlled-substance offense; if sustained, his guideline range would have been 51–63 months.
- The district court overruled Boyd’s objection, adopted the PSI calculation, and sentenced him to 120 months (the top of the 110–120 range).
- Boyd appealed the guideline-calculation ruling; the government moved to dismiss based on the sentence-appeal waiver. The Eleventh Circuit granted the government’s motion and dismissed the appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the sentence-appeal waiver barred Boyd from appealing the district court’s guideline calculation | Boyd: waiver ambiguous because it doesn’t specify who determines the advisory guideline range; thus he can still appeal the calculation | Government: waiver unambiguously refers to the guideline range as determined by the district court; appeals barred unless sentence exceeds that range | Waiver unambiguous; it refers to the range as determined by the district court; appeal barred because sentence (120 months) was within the 110–120 guideline range |
| Whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary | Boyd: waiver not knowingly/voluntarily made because court didn’t discuss all exceptions or explicitly say he waived appeals of guideline calculations | Government: court’s Rule 11 colloquy, Boyd’s initials/signature, and explicit advice that a within-guidelines sentence cannot be appealed show the waiver was knowing and voluntary | Waiver was knowing and voluntary; district court sufficiently advised Boyd during plea colloquy and the record makes it manifestly clear he understood the waiver |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993) (defendant must be questioned at plea colloquy about appeal waiver or record must show understanding)
- United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166 (11th Cir. 1999) (appeal waivers in plea agreements enforceable if knowingly and voluntarily made)
- United States v. Buchanan, 131 F.3d 1005 (11th Cir. 1997) (government may move to dismiss appeal based on valid waiver; enforcing waiver preserves bargained-for benefit)
- Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (district court must determine the applicable Guidelines range)
- United States v. Hardman, 778 F.3d 896 (11th Cir. 2014) (plea-agreement language given ordinary and natural meaning)
- United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101 (11th Cir. 2004) (ambiguities in plea agreements construed against the government)
- United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming enforcement of appeal waiver when referenced in Rule 11 colloquy and defendant acknowledged understanding)
