United States v. Alkazahg, 202000087

Background

Appellant (Pvt. Ali Alkazahg) pleaded guilty, conditionally, to fraudulent enlistment, two false official statements, and two specifications for possessing machineguns—one alleging a bump stock and the other two "switches"—in exchange for specified segmented confinement ranges, a bad-conduct discharge, total forfeitures, and reduction to E‑1.
He was detained at Offutt AFB after being flagged in DBIDS; agents found two pistols, a rifle, ammo, a bump stock, and later, during a parental-consent search, two switches.
Appellant moved to dismiss the bump‑stock specification for failure to state an offense, challenging the ATF’s Final Rule classifying modern bump stocks as "machineguns" under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).
The military judge denied the motion; Appellant preserved the issue for appeal and also argued the judge erred by not inquiring into his understanding of plea‑agreement sentencing terms.
The NMCCA (published) held the statute ambiguous but adopted a "mechanical" reading of "by a single function of the trigger," concluded a modern bump stock does not make a semi‑automatic weapon a machinegun, set aside and dismissed the bump‑stock specification, found no prejudicial plea‑inquiry error, and reassessed sentence appropriateness, reducing confinement and affirming the unitary punishments.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a modern bump stock makes a semi‑automatic firearm a “machinegun” under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (failure to state an offense)	Bump stock does not change the firearm’s internal mechanical function; each round still fires by a single mechanical function of the trigger (mechanical reading).	ATF’s interpretation (and Chevron deference) treats bump‑fire as automatic because recoil + bump stock produce continuous fire by a single shooter action (shooter‑focused reading).	Statute ambiguous, but "by a single function of the trigger" refers to the firearm’s mechanical function; modern bump stock requires additional human action and is not a machinegun; specification dismissed.
Whether Chevron deference governs the ATF Final Rule (and whether the Government may waive it)	Chevron should not control in criminal context; courts should construe criminal statutes.	ATF interpretation is reasonable; Chevron would support agency view; alternatively Government may waive reliance on Chevron.	Government may waive Chevron; court avoided deciding whether Chevron applies in criminal cases and proceeded without Chevron.
Whether the military judge erred by not inquiring into Appellant’s understanding of plea‑agreement sentencing terms	Appellant contends the judge failed to ensure he understood sentencing terms tied to the plea.	Government contends no such prejudicial omission occurred; plea and waiver were knowing and supported.	No prejudicial error—Appellant showed good cause for his election change and plea remained valid.
Whether remaining segmented and unitary punishments were appropriate after dismissal of bump‑stock spec	Appellant argued reassessment required; defense urged mitigation evidence and lesser confinement.	Government relied on plea terms; requested maximums for some specs but offered little sentencing justification.	Court reassessed: reduced segmented confinement (fraudulent enlistment 30 days, gunnery sergeant false statement 30 days, gate false statement 12 months, switches 24 months) and affirmed unitary punishments (BCD, total forfeiture, reduction to E‑1); total confinement affirmed at 24 months concurrent.

Key Cases Cited

Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishes agency deference framework).
HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass'n, 141 S. Ct. 2172 (2021) (Government may waive reliance on Chevron; Court declined to consider deference where waiver).
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (agency interpretations in criminal contexts may be accorded weight but Court did not rest on Chevron).
United States v. Staples, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (background explanation of "automatic" vs. "semiautomatic" weapons).
United States v. Apel, 571 U.S. 359 (2014) (observations that government readings of criminal statutes are not entitled to deference).
United States v. Abramski, 573 U.S. 169 (2014) (criminal laws are for courts to construe; agency positions not dispositive).
Gun Owners of Am., Inc. v. Garland, 992 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2021) (panel questioned applying Chevron to bump‑stock Final Rule in criminal context).
United States v. Camp, 343 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2003) (example of a device that transformed a firearm into automatic fire; distinguishes true mechanical conversions from "trigger activators").