United States v. Alexander
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6117
| 10th Cir. | 2016Background
- Defendant Eric Alexander, a federal “sex offender” based on 2012 California convictions, was released on parole and had registered in California as a transient but failed to re-register every 30 days.
- In September 2013 Alexander traveled by bus to Las Cruces, New Mexico, where Cynthia Williams picked him up; he stayed at her apartment from Sept. 5 until his arrest on Sept. 23 (about 18 days), kept his belongings there, changed clothes, and helped buy food.
- Alexander did not notify parole or New Mexico authorities of a change of residence and made no serious effort to travel to Texas as he had claimed.
- He was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (SORNA) for failing to register after changing residence, tried by jury, convicted, and sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment plus supervised release.
- On appeal the Tenth Circuit found the evidence sufficient under the instructions given but reversed the conviction because the district court’s jury instruction defining “habitually lives” omitted the SORNA Guidelines’ 30‑day formulation, an error the court deemed not harmless.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Alexander) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Alexander changed his residence under SORNA | Evidence (stay of ~18 days, kept belongings, lived there exclusively, no parole notice) supports inference he intended to make Williams’ apartment his home or habitually lived there | Alexander: no intent to remain; evidence showed he intended to travel to Texas; Williams said he had not “moved in” | Court: Evidence was sufficient under the instructions given to permit conviction (but not dispositive because of instruction error) |
| Jury instruction on meaning of “habitually lives” (Instruction No. 10) | Gov’t: district court instruction ("lives with some regularity") was adequate and referencing 30 days could be misleading | Alexander: requested instruction defining “habitually lives” to include “intends to make his home” and “lives for at least 30 days” per SORNA Guidelines | Held: District court erred by omitting the 30‑day standard from the definition; error was not harmless and requires reversal and remand |
| Jury instruction on “resides/makes home” language (Instruction No. 9) | Gov’t: instruction tracking statute and ‘‘maintains his home’’ was sufficient | Alexander: argued omission of “make his home” formulation could misstate law | Held: Instruction No. 9 was adequate—“maintains his home” sufficiently tracked the statutory language |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rodella, 804 F.3d 1317 (10th Cir.) (standard for sufficiency review)
- United States v. Wampler, 703 F.3d 815 (5th Cir.) (affirmed similar SORNA instruction but did not address 30‑day omission)
- United States v. Thompson, 811 F.3d 717 (5th Cir.) (discussed interplay of 3‑day reporting rule and 30‑day habitually lives standard)
- United States v. Murphy, 664 F.3d 798 (10th Cir.) (treatment of "change in residence" under SORNA)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court) (harmless‑error standard for omitted elements)
- Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (Supreme Court) (jury reliance on legally inadequate theory requires reversal)
- McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (Supreme Court) (erroneous jury instructions and reversible error principles)