United States v. Alex Cartagena-Lopez
979 F.3d 356
5th Cir.2020Background
- Cartagena-Lopez was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release beginning November 25, 2015 (scheduled to end November 25, 2018).
- Release conditions required reporting to probation within 72 hours and avoiding new criminal conduct.
- Probation petitioned to revoke on Feb 12, 2016 for failure to report; an arrest warrant issued the same day and he became a fugitive.
- He was arrested on an outstanding warrant on October 19–22, 2019 after living under an alias; probation added alleged October 2019 offenses (public intoxication, failure to identify).
- District court revoked supervised release and sentenced him to 12 months; on appeal the Fifth Circuit addressed whether fugitive tolling suspends a supervised-release term so post-expiration conduct remains revocable.
- The Fifth Circuit held fugitive tolling applies to supervised release and affirmed the revocation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether fugitive tolling applies to supervised release and thus tolls the supervised-release term while a defendant is a fugitive | United States: fugitive tolling suspends the supervised-release term while the defendant is a fugitive, preserving court jurisdiction to revoke for subsequent misconduct | Cartagena-Lopez: supervised release expired Nov 25, 2018, so the court lacked jurisdiction to revoke for October 2019 conduct | Court adopted fugitive tolling for supervised release and affirmed revocation |
| Whether statutes governing supervised release (§3583(i) and §3624(e)) preclude fugitive tolling | United States: §3583(i) governs post-expiration proceedings but does not address tolling; §3624(e) governs tolling for imprisonment and is not an exhaustive rule excluding fugitive tolling | Cartagena-Lopez: §3624(e)’s express tolling for imprisonment implies exclusion of other tolling (expressio unius); §3583(i) limits post-expiration authority | Court rejected expressio unius; §3583(i) does not foreclose tolling; §3624(e) is a specific rule about imprisonment, not an abrogation of the common-law fugitive-tolling rule |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Barinas, 865 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2017) (adopting fugitive tolling for supervised release)
- United States v. Island, 916 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2019) (adopting fugitive tolling for supervised release)
- United States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448 (4th Cir. 2011) (adopting fugitive tolling)
- United States v. Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2005) (adopting fugitive tolling)
- United States v. Hernandez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting fugitive tolling)
- Anderson v. Corral, 263 U.S. 193 (1923) (Supreme Court recognition of common-law rule tolling sentences for fugitives)
- Phillips v. Dutton, 378 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1967) (Fifth Circuit application of tolling principles in parole context)
- United States v. Jackson, 426 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing supervised release purposes)