United States v. Adolph Spears, Sr., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10020

Background

Spears was convicted (2000 trial) for participation in a cocaine-trafficking conspiracy and sentenced in 2001 to life imprisonment; the PSR and the court attributed to him involvement with an 11‑kilogram powder cocaine load that was processed into crack.
At sentencing the court found Spears’ relevant conduct involved more than 1.5 kg of crack, applied base offense level 38, added enhancements (weapons and leadership) and adopted criminal history IV, yielding life under the Guidelines.
Amendment 750 (made retroactive by amendment 759) raised crack-quantity thresholds: under the 2012 table level 38 requires ≥8.4 kg (previously ≥1.5 kg); a 1.5 kg finding would now correspond to level 34.
In 2013 Spears moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to reduce his sentence, arguing the amended table would lower his Guidelines range to 30 years–life (total offense level 40).
The district court denied the motion, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because the sentencing record attributed at least 11 kg (powder converted to crack) to Spears, so Amendment 750 did not lower his applicable Guidelines range.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding the record supported attribution of at least 11 kg of crack-equivalent to Spears and therefore Amendment 750 did not have the effect of lowering his applicable range under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Spears)	Defendant's Argument (Gov't/District Court)	Held
Whether the district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to consider a sentence reduction after Amendment 750	Spears: sentencing findings only established “in excess of 1.5 kg” of crack; under the amended table 1.5 kg maps to a lower base level, so his range would be reduced	Court/Gov’t: record shows attribution of the 11‑kg Cadillac load that was cooked into crack, so under amended table Spears still exceeds the 8.4‑kg threshold for base level 38 and his range is unchanged	Held: No jurisdiction under § 3582(c)(2) because Amendment 750 did not lower Spears’ applicable guideline range; affirmed.
Whether the district court erred by relying on prior sentencing findings that may not comply with Rule 32	Spears: the sentencing court failed to rule on each PSR objection point-by-point (Rule 32), so those findings should not be used to deny § 3582 relief	Court/Gov’t: § 3582(c)(2) is a limited proceeding; it is not a vehicle to relitigate procedural defects in the original sentencing; relying on those findings was appropriate	Held: No error—§ 3582 relief is limited and the district court properly relied on the 2001 findings.
Whether precedents from other circuits (Hamilton, Hall) require remand for factfinding	Spears: Hamilton and Hall show ambiguity in prior findings can require remand or further factfinding	Court/Gov’t: Those cases turned on particular factual ambiguities or inaccurate memoranda that are not present here	Held: Those authorities are inapposite; no remand required.
Whether Amendment 782 (filed later) affects the appeal	Spears: Amendment 782 further lowered thresholds and might entitle him to relief	Court/Gov’t: Amendment 782 took effect after the district court’s denial; Spears may file a new § 3582(c)(2) motion based on Amendment 782 in district court	Held: Amendment 782 does not affect this appeal; court expresses no view on future relief under 782.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Hernandez, 645 F.3d 709 (5th Cir.) (affirming denial where prior sentencing attributed a quantity far above amended threshold)
United States v. Hamilton, 715 F.3d 328 (11th Cir.) (remand required where district court relied on factually inaccurate memoranda)
United States v. Hall, 582 F.3d 816 (7th Cir.) (remand where district court ignored ambiguity in plea admissions about crack quantity)
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (§ 3582(c)(2) authorizes only limited sentence reductions, not plenary resentencing)
United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir.) (general rule that courts may not alter a term of imprisonment once imposed)