United States v. ADEYEMI, 470 F.Supp.3d 489

Background

Samson Adeyemi (convicted in 2006 at age 19) served as the getaway driver in two non‑violent Hobbs Act robberies; a jury convicted him and he was sentenced to 385 months (about 32 years) largely because of consecutive § 924(c) “stacking.”
His three co‑defendants received much shorter terms after plea deals and have been released; had Adeyemi been sentenced under current law (First Step Act § 403), his term would be far shorter (about 168 months).
Adeyemi has lifelong asthma, is designated chronic‑care, and is housed at FCI Fort Dix during a COVID‑19 outbreak where social distancing, testing, and hygiene are limited.
After exhausting BOP administrative remedies, Adeyemi moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); the Warden denied his request.
The district court considered whether judges may independently determine “other” extraordinary and compelling reasons under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D), evaluated Adeyemi’s health and sentencing‑law change claims, applied BOP Program Statement 5050.50 factors and § 3553(a), and granted release to time served plus five years supervised release.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Authority to define “other” extraordinary & compelling reasons	First Step Act removed BOP’s exclusive gatekeeper; courts can decide these reasons	Gov: Dillon + Commission policy statements bind courts; Note 1(D) vests Director with determinations	Court: First Step Act made courts co‑decisional; the phrase "as determined by the Director" conflicts with the statute and courts may independently assess “other” reasons while consulting BOP/Commission guidance
Asthma + COVID‑19 as extraordinary/compelling	Adeyemi: chronic asthma + inability to exercise/obtain meds during Fort Dix outbreak elevates risk	Gov: Medical records show mild/intermittent asthma—not CDC “moderate/severe” high‑risk category	Court: Asthma alone insufficient; but COVID risk, lockdown, limited self‑care, and medication issues are relevant and weigh into the overall analysis
§ 924(c) stacking change (First Step Act) as basis for relief	Adeyemi: non‑retroactive legislative change shows his sentence is excessive and is an “other” reason (esp. in combination with health risks)	Gov: Amendment not retroactive; permitting relief would undermine finality and resurrect parole‑like discretion	Court: Change alone does not qualify as extraordinary and compelling, but non‑retroactivity does not bar courts from considering the amendment in combination with other factors on individualized review
Application of BOP Program Statement factors and §3553(a)	Apply BOP’s nine “other” factors (nature of offense, history, time served, release plan) and §3553(a) to find relief appropriate	Gov: Courts should adhere to Commission/BOP guidance; but concedes §3553(a) favors reduction here	Court: Using BOP factors and §3553(a), found low culpability, clean pre‑offense record, lengthy sentence disparity, rehabilitation, release plan, and no danger to community — granted compassionate release (time served + 5 yrs supervised release)

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Dillon, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (courts must follow applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements unless contrary to statute)
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (Commission commentary is authoritative unless inconsistent with statute or plainly erroneous)
United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997) (Commission commentary must yield when at odds with clear congressional directive)
Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Sentencing Guidelines are advisory post‑Booker)
United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 2020) (presence of COVID‑19 in prisons, by itself, does not automatically justify compassionate release)
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (interpretation of retroactivity and application of new sentencing law to pre‑Act offenders)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (importance of finality in criminal sentences)