United States v. Abid Stevens, 70 F.4th 653

In Jan. 2020 Stevens, Quinn, and Smith confronted a convenience-store clerk, returned with guns, forced the clerk to the register, and $100 was taken; all three were later arrested and tried.
The District Court instructed the jury that Hobbs Act robbery liability could be based on direct commission, aiding and abetting, or Pinkerton conspiracy; §924(c) liability was charged on direct or aiding-and-abetting theories.
The jury returned a general guilty verdict as to all defendants; Stevens appealed raising two principal challenges: (1) that Hobbs Act robbery requires a specific intent to permanently deprive/asportation (per United States v. Nedley) and the jury was not so instructed; and (2) his §924(c) conviction fails because his conviction (based on aiding/Pinkerton) does not qualify as a "crime of violence."
Nedley (3d Cir. 1958) had read common-law elements—specific intent to permanently deprive and carrying away—into the Hobbs Act; Stevens relied on Nedley to argue the jury omission was reversible.
The Third Circuit concluded Nedley is abrogated by intervening Supreme Court precedent (notably Carter and Culbert), held Hobbs Act robbery is a general-intent offense, and ruled that a Hobbs Act robbery conviction under aiding-and-abetting or Pinkerton theories qualifies as a §924(c) crime of violence, so Stevens’s convictions were affirmed.

Issue	Stevens' Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Hobbs Act robbery requires a specific intent to permanently deprive and an asportation/carrying-away element (per Nedley).	Hobbs Act robbery requires specific intent to permanently deprive and carrying away; jury omission deprived him of an essential element.	Nedley was wrongly read to import common-law elements; Supreme Court precedent (Carter, Culbert) shows the Hobbs Act’s text controls and general intent suffices for forceful takings.	Nedley is abrogated; Hobbs Act robbery is a general-intent crime and no specific-permanent-deprivation or carrying-away instruction was required.
Whether a Hobbs Act robbery conviction based on aiding-and-abetting or Pinkerton theory qualifies as a "crime of violence" under §924(c).	A conviction based on aiding/Pinkerton for a completed robbery does not categorically qualify as a §924(c) predicate (challenge framed as sufficiency).	Aiding-and-abetting and Pinkerton liability incorporate the substantive offense elements (including use of force); completed Hobbs Act robbery (and imputed co-conspirator/principal force) satisfies §924(c)(3)(A).	Under either aiding-and-abetting or Pinkerton theories, a completed Hobbs Act robbery satisfies §924(c)’s elements clause; Stevens’s §924(c) conviction stands.

Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (rejecting importation of extra common-law robbery elements where statute unambiguously defines offense)
United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (relying on statutory text to define Hobbs Act offenses rather than importing common-law elements)
United States v. Nedley, 255 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1958) (earlier Third Circuit decision importing specific-intent and asportation into Hobbs Act robbery)
United States v. Stoney, 62 F.4th 108 (3d Cir. 2023) (held completed Hobbs Act robbery is a categorical §924(c) crime of violence; left open aiding/Pinkerton question)
Taylor v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (addressing the elements-clause categorical inquiry for §924(c))
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (directing that categorical approach looks only to statutory elements, not underlying facts)
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (establishing conspiracy liability for reasonably foreseeable acts of co-conspirators)
Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729 (interpreting "obtaining of property" in Hobbs Act extortion and limits on what counts as "property")