United States Ex Rel. Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc.
887 F.3d 1081
| 11th Cir. | 2018Background
- Relator Billy Joe Hunt, a Parsons employee, alleged Parsons and Cochise defrauded the U.S. by steering a security subcontract in Iraq to Cochise through bribery, forged directives, and a no-bid award, causing excess payments in 2006.
- Hunt reported the scheme to FBI agents on November 30, 2010; he later pled guilty in an unrelated kickback case and served prison time.
- Hunt filed a qui tam False Claims Act (FCA) complaint under seal on November 27, 2013; the United States declined to intervene and the complaint was unsealed.
- Defendants moved to dismiss as time-barred under 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1) (six-year bar); Hunt argued § 3731(b)(2)’s three-year rule (tied to government knowledge, subject to a 10-year absolute bar) made his filing timely.
- The district court dismissed, holding § 3731(b)(2) did not apply when the government declined to intervene or that it was triggered by the relator’s knowledge; Hunt appealed.
- The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding § 3731(b)(2) applies in non-intervened qui tam suits and is triggered by the government official’s knowledge, so dismissal at the motion-to-dismiss stage was improper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 3731(b)(2)’s 3-year limitations period applies when the U.S. declines to intervene | § 3731(b)(2) applies to relators in non-intervened qui tam suits; Hunt filed within 3 years of government learning facts | § 3731(b)(2) only applies when the U.S. is a party; applying it in non-intervened cases yields absurd or burdensome results | The 3-year period in § 3731(b)(2) applies to relators even when the U.S. declines to intervene |
| Whether the § 3731(b)(2) trigger is the relator’s knowledge or a government official’s knowledge | Trigger is government official’s knowledge (statutory text) | Trigger should be relator’s knowledge (practical; courts have done so) | Trigger is the knowledge of the U.S. official charged with responsibility, not the relator’s knowledge |
| Whether applying § 3731(b)(2) to non-intervened suits is absurd or renders § 3731(b)(1) superfluous | Application is consistent with FCA structure; relators still have incentives to report promptly and other statutory limits prevent gamesmanship | Produces bizarre results and would negate the six-year rule, imposing burdens on defendants | Not absurd; statutory context and FCA incentives prevent superfluousness; concerns overstated |
| Whether dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds was proper on the complaint face | Hunt: complaint alleges FBI learned facts Nov. 30, 2010 and suit filed within 3 years; not obviously time-barred | Defendants: complaint shows suit filed more than six years after the 2006 conduct so untimely | Dismissal was improper at motion-to-dismiss stage because complaint plausibly pleads timeliness under § 3731(b)(2) |
Key Cases Cited
- Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) (materiality and FCA background)
- Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409 (2005) (construed “action under § 3730” to exclude retaliation claims)
- Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928 (2009) (United States is not a party when it declines to intervene)
- Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010) (discovery-accrual rule for limitations periods)
- United States ex rel. Sanders v. N. Am. Bus. Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (held § 3731(b)(2) unavailable in non-intervened suits)
- United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 2006) (same)
- United States ex rel. Hyatt v. Northrop Corp., 91 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1996) (trigger tied to relator’s knowledge; rejected here)