United Motorcoach Assn, Inc. v. City of Austin
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4835
5th Cir.2017Background
- Austin adopted an ordinance regulating "charter bus service" (intracity buses with capacity ≥16), imposing permitting requirements (applications, vehicle inspections, driver licenses, proof of federal/state authority), operational rules (drop-off, breakdown procedures), and decal-display rules.
- United Motorcoach Association (UMA) sued Austin seeking to enjoin the permitting and decal regulations as preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 14501; district court enjoined the decal rules but denied relief on permitting rules; UMA appealed only the permitting-rules denial.
- Central statutory provision: 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a) broadly preempts state/local rules "relating to" motor carriers, with an exception in § 14501(a)(2) preserving a State’s "safety regulatory authority" with respect to motor vehicles (and a separate financial-responsibility exception).
- The district court concluded the permitting regulations fit within the safety exception as an exercise of the City’s traditional police power to promote safety and thus were not preempted; the Fifth Circuit reviewed that legal conclusion de novo.
- The Fifth Circuit applied precedent interpreting the nearly identical safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A) (Ours Garage line of cases), asking whether the ordinance evinces a safety purpose and whether there is a nexus between the provisions and safety.
- The court held Austin’s permitting regulations were "genuinely responsive" to safety (preamble statements, specific operational requirements, enforcement/remedies) and thus not preempted; affirmed the denial of a permanent injunction as to permitting rules.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (UMA) | Defendant's Argument (Austin) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 14501(a)(2) safety exception applies to municipal charter-bus permitting | Safety exception does not apply; the permitting rules "relate to" authority to provide charter service and are preempted | Safety exception (interpreted like §14501(c)(2)(A)) preserves municipal/state safety regulatory authority, including permitting | The safety exception applies; municipal permitting can fall within § 14501(a)(2) |
| Whether the permitting regulations are "genuinely responsive to safety" | City failed to show specific provisions are safety-related; court must assess provisions individually | Ordinance preamble, regulatory text, and enforcement demonstrate safety purpose and nexus to safety | The regulations are genuinely responsive to safety; nexus and safety motive shown |
| Whether the city’s use of "motor vehicles" language limits safety authority to vehicle mechanics only | "With respect to motor vehicles" should be read narrowly to exclude non-mechanical safety rules | "Safety regulatory authority with respect to motor vehicles" reasonably covers safety rules applied to vehicles and operations, not just mechanical specs | Court rejects UMA’s narrow reading; language covers safety-regulatory authority applied to motor vehicles broadly |
| Whether federal policy against regulatory "balkanization" compels a narrow reading of the safety exception | Broad application undermines federal deregulatory aims and leads to fragmented local regimes | Statutory text and existing precedent support the exception; Secretary of Transportation can invalidate state laws under § 31141 if no safety benefit | Court refuses to narrow the exception for policy reasons; text and precedent control |
Key Cases Cited
- Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (discussion of congressional preemptive purpose)
- CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (statutory text as primary evidence of preemptive intent)
- City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (holding safety exception covers municipal regulations and framing "genuinely responsive to safety" inquiry)
- Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (presumptions against preemption when multiple readings exist)
- Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (identical words in same act presumed to have same meaning)
- Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (specific provision can prevail over general, canon discussed)
- Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237 (statutory interpretation canon against rendering parts inoperative)
- Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (courts heed Congress’ use of different terms to convey different meanings)
- VRC LLC v. City of Dallas, 460 F.3d 607 (Fifth Circuit applying safety-exception analysis)
- Cole v. City of Dallas, 314 F.3d 730 (permitting deemed within safety-regulatory authority)
- California Tow Truck Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 807 F.3d 1008 (Ninth Circuit safety-exception guidance)
- Houston Prof’l Towing Ass’n v. City of Houston, 812 F.3d 443 (Fifth Circuit applying safety-exception factors)
- Cutrera v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Louisiana State Univ., 429 F.3d 108 (procedural forfeiture principles)