934 F. Supp. 2d 1167
D. Ariz.2013Background
- SB 1365 adds payroll deduction limits for political purposes and includes broad exemptions and a renewal/recission mechanism.
- SB 1363 expands labor-relations rules, including picketing, mass assembly, and new harassment and defamation provisions; creates no-trespass lists and enhanced penalties.
- Plaintiffs (unions and officers) challenge SB 1365 as unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds and seek preemption under LMRA §302; intervenors join SB 1363 challenges.
- Court previously granted preliminary injunction against SB 1365; now grants summary judgment that SB 1365 is preempted and facially viewpoint-discriminatory.
- SB 1363 challenges include facial overbreadth/vagueness in several provisions and NLRA preemption; the court engages in severability analysis for constitutional sections.
- Various sections of SB 1363 are found unconstitutional or preempted, leading to permanent injunctions against those provisions and partial constitutional rulings on others.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preemption of SB 1365 by LMRA § 302 | Plaintiffs contend SB 1365 is preempted by LMRA § 302. | Horne argues no preemption; statute constitutional under applicable standards. | SB 1365 preempted by LMRA § 302. |
| SB 1365 viewpoint discrimination | SB 1365 burdens unions in a way not applied to others, forcing pre-emptive strict scrutiny. | SB 1365 is content-neutral and not viewpoint-discriminatory. | SB 1365 facially viewpoint-discriminatory; strict scrutiny applied. |
| Constitutionality of SB 1363 sections (facial challenges) | SB 1363 sections (esp. 23-1322, 23-1325, 23-1327, 23-1329) are unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds and preempted. | Defendants contend portions are constitutional or severable; some preemption arguments raised. | Several subsections unconstitutional or preempted; others severable or constitutional in part; many sections enjoined. |
| Defamation/monetary remedies (SB 1363 § 23-1325) | Defamation provision targets a protected category and is preempted and unconstitutional. | Defendants justify remedies under state interests. | § 23-1325 unconstitutional in its entirety; preemption applicable to related speech. |
| No trespass and mass assembly provisions (SB 1363 § 23-1326, § 23-1327) | Mass assembly and no-trespass provisions are overbroad/vague and preempted. | Provisions can be read to avoid constitutional problems; severability possible. | Key subsections struck or narrowed; some portions saved via narrow interpretation; remaining challenged provisions enjoined. |
Key Cases Cited
- SeaPak v. Industrial, Technical & Professional Employees Division of National Maritime Union, AFL-CIO, 300 F.Supp.1197 (S.D. Ga. 1969) (preemption under LMRA §302 for checkoffs; field and conflict preemption discussed)
- Sea Pak v. Indus. Technical & Prof'l Employees, Div. of Nat'l Mar. Union, AFL-CIO, 400 U.S. 985 (U.S. Supreme Court 1971) (affirmed SeaPak ruling on preemption scope)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (U.S. Supreme Court 1989) (time/place/manner restrictions; content neutrality and tailoring standards)
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (U.S. Supreme Court 1992) (content-based restrictions subject to strict scrutiny)
- Grady v. City of Chicago (Mosley referenced as Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley), 408 U.S. 92 (U.S. Supreme Court 1972) (limitations on discriminatory picketing; content discrimination concerns)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399 (U.S. Supreme Court 1988) (preemption analysis in LMRA context; field vs. conflict preemption)
- Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 329 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2003) (standing in First Amendment context)
- Wisconsin Education Association Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2013) (government funding distinctions not necessarily viewpoint discrimination)
- Garmon preemption, 359 U.S. 244 (1959) (state regulation exception for deeply rooted local interests)
- National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (U.S. Supreme Court 1998) (funding decisions not viewpoint discrimination per se)