472 P.3d 1064
Cal.2020Background
- IGRA (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A)) permits class III (casino‑style) gaming on land the federal government takes into trust for a tribe after Oct. 17, 1988 only if the Interior Secretary makes a two‑part finding (best interest / not detrimental) and the state Governor "concurs."
- In 2000 California voters adopted Proposition 1A (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19(f)), authorizing the Governor to "negotiate and conclude compacts…for…class III gaming by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance with federal law," but the amendment does not expressly mention gubernatorial concurrences under IGRA.
- Enterprise Rancheria sought trust acquisition for an off‑reservation casino; the Interior Secretary made the two‑part determination and Governor Brown sent a concurrence in 2012; the land was later taken into trust and the casino opened.
- United Auburn sued, alleging the Governor lacked authority under California law to issue the IGRA concurrence (and that the concurrence violated separation of powers and was invalid because the compact negotiation occurred before the land was trust land). Trial court sustained demurrer; Court of Appeal affirmed; other appellate decisions (Stand Up!) held the opposite; Supreme Court granted review.
- Holding (majority): California law empowers the Governor to concur under IGRA — Proposition 1A’s text and context, historical gubernatorial practice, Gov. Code § 12012 (Governor as state’s federal representative), and separation‑of‑powers principles support that implicit power; the Legislature may by statute restrict/eliminate it but has not done so. Chief Justice Cantil‑Sakauye dissented, concluding voters did not authorize a concurrence power in Proposition 1A.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (United Auburn) | Defendant's Argument (Newsom/Governor) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether California law authorizes the Governor to "concur" in the Interior Secretary’s IGRA two‑part determination | Prop 1A did not grant a concurrence power; concurrence is not among Governor’s compacting powers; state law therefore forbids it | Prop 1A authorizes compacts “on Indian lands in accordance with federal law,” and IGRA presupposes gubernatorial concurrence; historical practice and statutory framework imply the Governor has concurrence power | Held: Governor has authority to concur under California law (majority) |
| Whether Proposition 1A’s reference to "Indian/tribal lands" excludes after‑acquired trust lands that require a concurrence | Voters meant to permit gaming only where no concurrence was required (reservation and pre‑IGRA trust lands), not on after‑acquired trust lands that depend on concurrence | "Indian/tribal lands" should be read consistent with federal law (IGRA): includes reservation and trust lands; Prop 1A’s language/context allow compacts (and thus gaming) on those lands | Held: "Indian/tribal lands" is reasonably read to include trust lands defined by federal law, so Prop 1A does not categorically bar concurrences |
| Whether a Governor’s concurrence is an improper exercise of legislative power (separation of powers) | Concurrence is essentially a legislative act with major land‑use and tax impacts and intrudes on legislative prerogatives | Concurrence fits within executive role: Governor represents state to federal government; historical practice shows governors may concur in cooperative federalism schemes; concurrence does not usurp Legislature (which ratifies compacts and may restrict concurrence by statute) | Held: Concurrence is consistent with separation of powers; it is an executive function with cross‑branch effects but not an unlawful usurpation |
| Whether Governor exceeded authority here by negotiating/ratifying a compact before land was taken into trust | Compact and concurrence were invalid because compacting power applies only to existing "Indian land" at the time of negotiation | Prop 1A does not limit compacting to parcels already held in trust; historical practice includes compacts negotiated before trust acquisition | Held: No temporal limitation; Governor’s negotiation and concurrence were lawful where the tribe later obtained trust status |
Key Cases Cited
- Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1952) (framework for executive authority and "zone of twilight")
- California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1987) (distinguishing prohibitory vs. regulatory state law over tribal gaming)
- United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (U.S. 1978) (tribal sovereignty as unique and limited)
- Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (U.S. 1989) (Congress’s plenary power in Indian affairs)
- Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (U.S. 1996) (state sovereign immunity and IGRA enforcement context)
- Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782 (U.S. 2014) (tribal gaming as integral to tribal government/economic self‑sufficiency)
- Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Int’l Union v. Davis, 21 Cal.4th 585 (Cal. 1999) (invalidating Proposition 5 and explaining constitutional limits on casino legalization in California)
- Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. U.S., 110 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1997) (state law determines whether a governor has authority to act under IGRA)
- In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2003) (IGRA compacting framework and state obligations)
- Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (U.S. 1981) (statutes and historical practice can inform scope of executive power)