896 F.3d 1158
10th Cir.2018Background
- Robert Ukeiley, a Colorado resident with a lung condition, sued to challenge EPA’s 2016 approval of Colorado’s PM-10 maintenance plan for the Lamar area after the EPA concurred with Colorado’s request to exclude certain exceedances as "exceptional events."
- Lamar (eastern Colorado plains) historically experienced wind-driven fugitive dust (PM-10); EPA redesignated it attainment in 2005 after Colorado submitted a 10-year maintenance plan; Colorado submitted a revised plan in 2013 covering through 2025.
- Colorado asked the EPA to exclude 55 PM-10 exceedances (high-wind events); the EPA concurred on 34 after reviewing meteorological, soil, and controls data and soliciting comment, then approved the plan in 2016.
- The statutory and regulatory framework: the Clean Air Act allows exclusion of monitoring data influenced by "exceptional events" (42 U.S.C. § 7619); EPA’s Exceptional Events Rule and high-wind guidance set technical elements (e.g., not reasonably controllable, clear causal relationship, outside historical fluctuations).
- Ukeiley argued the exclusions were unlawful because frequent windy days in Lamar are not "exceptional" (i.e., not rare), so the EPA arbitrarily and capriciously applied the statute and rule.
- The Tenth Circuit reviewed under the APA (arbitrary-and-capricious standard) and Chevron deference, evaluated statutory text, EPA rule and guidance, and the administrative record, and denied the petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "exceptional event" excludes recurring natural high-wind events | Ukeiley: "Exceptional" requires rarity; frequent windy days cannot qualify | EPA/Colorado: statute distinguishes human-caused (must be unlikely to recur) from natural events (no recurrence limit); guidance requires events be outside normal historical fluctuations | The statute is unambiguous: natural events may recur; EPA’s interpretation and application were reasonable; exclusion upheld |
| Whether EPA’s application to exclude 34 exceedances was arbitrary or capricious | Ukeiley: EPA relied on flawed, insufficient evidence and misapplied criteria | EPA: relied on extensive meteorological, soil, and causal analyses per its Rule and guidance | Court: EPA’s decision was supported by technical data and reasoned analysis; not arbitrary or capricious |
| Scope/timing of challenge (timeliness) | Ukeiley: challenge targets EPA’s 2016 decision and statutory interpretation | EPA: contention that Ukeiley should have challenged Rule in 2007 | Court: challenge is to EPA’s application and statutory interpretation in this decision, not an untimely attack on the Rule itself; merits considered |
| Standard of review / deference to EPA technical judgments | Ukeiley: urges stricter reading of "exceptional" | EPA: invokes Chevron and deference to agency technical expertise | Court: applied Chevron framework; found statute clear re: natural events and in any ambiguity would defer to EPA; upheld agency expertise |
Key Cases Cited
- Sinclair Wyoming Ref. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir.) (describing APA §706 review scope)
- US Magnesium, LLC v. EPA, 690 F.3d 1157 (10th Cir. 2012) (arbitrary-and-capricious standard for EPA action)
- Maier v. EPA, 114 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 1997) (narrow but searching review of agency factfinding)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (two-step test for agency statutory interpretation)
- Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (follow explicit statutory definition over ordinary meaning)
- City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir.) (deference to agency technical determinations)
- Oklahoma v. EPA, 723 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir.) (applying Chevron deference to EPA interpretations)
