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840 F. Supp. 2d 287
D.D.C.
2012
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Background

  • Uhar seeks commissions from Jacob and Manna LLC under a brokerage agreement memorialized in a lease provision.
  • Manna LLC is a Virginia LLC with Jacob as its sole member and manager; he acts as its agent.
  • Lease section 25.8 contemplates paying Uhar 3% commissions to Landlord’s Broker.
  • The lease was signed by Jacob and the tenant Specialized Education of D.C., Inc.
  • The court previously held the lease terms satisfy the Statute of Frauds and now addresses agency, authority, and extent of services.
  • There is a genuine factual dispute about whether Uhar actually performed brokerage services, leading to partial denial of summary judgment.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Agency binding of Manna LLC Uhar shows Jacob acted as Manna’s agent. Jacob lacked authority to bind Manna LLC. Manna LLC is a party via agency; Jacob had actual authority.
Statute of Frauds applicability Lease memorializes essential terms; satisfies Statute of Frauds. Defendants unaware of contents immunize them from enforceability. Statute of Frauds does not bar claim.
Existence of brokerage services performed Lease language confirms broker's efforts secured a tenant. Plaintiff did not perform meaningful brokerage services. Genuine dispute of material fact regarding plaintiff’s performance; summary judgment denied on this point.
Scope of principal’s liability under authority Authority to execute agreements on behalf of Manna binds the principal. Authority disputed; no binding contract. Jacob acted within actual authority; Manna bound.
Effect of signed writing on contract enforceability Written memorandum suffices under Statute of Frauds. ignorance of terms is not a defense. Written memorandum satisfied Statute of Frauds; no defense based on ignorance.

Key Cases Cited

  • Columbia Hosp. for Women Found., Inc. v. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1997) (agency authority and binding contracts by agents when within scope of authority)
  • Toledano v. O’Connor, 501 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2007) (principal bound when agent enters contract within actual authority)
  • Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (evidence in support of allegations; standard for summary judgment)
  • Coffin v. District of Columbia, 320 A.2d 301 (D.C. 1974) (statute of frauds writing sufficiency; signed by agent satisfies requirement)
  • Tauber v. Quan, 938 A.2d 724 (D.C. 2007) (signing contract requires reader to read; ignorance is not a defense)
  • Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Morgan, 1910 WL 20828 (D.C. App. 1910) (contract ignorance not a defense; written contract duty to read)
  • Upton v. Tribilcock, 93 U.S. 45 (U.S. 1875) (contracts valid even if signer did not read)
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Case Details

Case Name: Uhar & Company, Inc. v. Jacob
Court Name: District Court, District of Columbia
Date Published: Jan 12, 2012
Citations: 840 F. Supp. 2d 287; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3627; 2012 WL 89873; Civil Action No. 2009-1698
Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2009-1698
Court Abbreviation: D.D.C.
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    Uhar & Company, Inc. v. Jacob, 840 F. Supp. 2d 287