U.S. ex rel. David Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
993 F.3d 428
| 6th Cir. | 2021Background
- Relator David Felten filed a qui tam suit (Aug. 30, 2010) alleging Beaumont Hospital paid kickbacks to induce referrals and violated the FCA and Michigan Medicaid FCA. The government intervened and settled; Felten’s retaliation claims remained.
- Felten amended to allege retaliatory acts that occurred after his termination, including alleged blacklisting that impaired his ability to obtain academic positions.
- The district court dismissed allegations of post-termination retaliation, holding 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1) protects only current employees (interpreting the phrase “in the terms and conditions of employment”).
- The district court certified an interlocutory question whether § 3730(h) protects former employees from post‑termination retaliation; Sixth Circuit granted permission to appeal.
- The Sixth Circuit majority reversed: holding § 3730(h) ambiguous on temporal scope, applying Robinson v. Shell Oil’s framework and concluding the FCA’s anti‑retaliation provision can cover former employees for post‑termination retaliation; vacated dismissal and remanded (leaving the blacklisting question to the district court).
- Judge Griffin dissented: argued the statute is unambiguous, canons (noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis), precedent, and statutory context counsel that § 3730(h) applies only when the plaintiff was an employee at the time of retaliation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 3730(h)(1) protects former employees from post‑termination retaliation | Felten: “employee” is not temporally limited; remedial provisions (reinstatement, special damages) and plain language permit relief for former employees | Beaumont: plain text and canons limit § 3730(h) to conduct occurring during employment; “terms and conditions of employment” and listed verbs imply current‑employee scope | The court held § 3730(h) can cover former employees; the term “employee” is ambiguous and, read in context/purpose, includes post‑termination retaliation; dismissal vacated and case remanded |
| Whether blacklisting qualifies as prohibited retaliation under “terms and conditions of employment” | Felten (raised on appeal): blacklisting is a form of post‑termination retaliation covered by § 3730(h) | Beaumont: argued § 3730(h) does not reach post‑termination acts; district court did not address blacklisting on the merits | Court declined to decide and remanded for the district court to consider blacklisting in the first instance |
Key Cases Cited
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (framework for when “employee(s)” may include former employees and when to consult broader statutory context)
- Potts v. Ctr. for Excellence in Higher Educ., 908 F.3d 610 (10th Cir. 2018) (held § 3730(h) does not cover post‑termination retaliation; contrary Tenth Circuit precedent)
- Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 772 F.3d 1056 (6th Cir. 2014) (interpreting “employee” under § 3730(h) and distinguishing applicants from employees)
- Binno v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 826 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2016) (standard of review for motion to dismiss; accept well‑pleaded facts)
- Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010) (use of “include” signals illustrative, non‑exhaustive remedial lists)
- Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., Ltd., 277 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2002) (special damages under anti‑retaliation provisions can be broad, including emotional distress)