U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Maryland Insurance Administration
879 F.3d 114
| 4th Cir. | 2018Background
- EEOC sued Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA) on behalf of three female fraud investigators (Cordaro, Green, Rogers) under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), alleging they were paid less than male fraud investigators performing substantially equal work.
- MIA assigns employees to grade/step pay levels under Maryland’s Standard Salary Schedule; step placement is discretionary and may reflect prior state service, experience, and credentials.
- EEOC identified four male comparators (Conticello, Hurley, Jacobs, Pennington) whose starting salaries were higher than the claimants’ though they held the same Fraud Investigator title.
- District court granted summary judgment for MIA, finding the EEOC failed to make a prima facie showing because male comparators were hired at higher steps and that pay differences were attributable to experience/qualifications.
- Fourth Circuit reversed: it held the EEOC established a prima facie EPA claim and found genuine issues of material fact about whether MIA’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons (salary schedule, prior-state credit, credentials) in fact explained the disparities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prima facie EPA showing | EEOC: claimants paid less than male investigators performing equal work — establishes prima facie case | MIA: male comparators not valid because hired at higher pay steps; so no prima facie case | Court: Prima facie established — same job, claimants paid less than at least one male comparator |
| Effect of pay schedule/step placement | EEOC: facially neutral pay system does not defeat prima facie; step differences go to employer’s affirmative defense | MIA: Standard Salary Schedule and step rules justify disparities as nondiscriminatory | Court: Use of schedule is neutral but MIA must show it in fact caused disparities; not established as a matter of law |
| Qualifications/experience justification (factor other than sex) | EEOC: qualifications may explain differences but factual disputes exist about whether they in fact did | MIA: Comparators had greater experience, certifications, or prior state service explaining higher pay | Court: These factors could explain disparities, but record lacks contemporaneous proof tying each salary decision to those factors — genuine factual issues preclude summary judgment |
| Standard for employer at summary judgment in EPA case | EEOC: once prima facie shown, employer must prove affirmative defense convincingly such that no reasonable jury could find otherwise | MIA: (implicit) ordinary summary judgment suffices if nondiscriminatory explanations are plausible | Court: Employer bears heavy burden — must show proffered reasons actually explain disparity; here MIA failed to meet that burden as a matter of law |
Key Cases Cited
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (summary judgment standard inferences) (1986)
- Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (EPA prima facie elements and framework) (1974)
- Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 1994) (EPA burden-shifting and employer burdens)
- Fowler v. Land Mgmt. Groupe, Inc., 978 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1992) (comparator requirement under EPA)
- Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 2000) (employer must show proffered reasons actually explain wage differential)
- Mickelson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 2006) (heavy employer burden at summary judgment in EPA cases)
- Tenkku v. Normandy Bank, 348 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 2003) (employer must convince that nondiscriminatory reason actually motivated pay differences)