443 F.Supp.3d 1270
D. Kan.2020Background
- Thomas Diebold suffered a stroke on January 21, 2013; he received therapy, had right-side weakness and related functional deficits, and was released by his personal physician to work on February 6, 2013.
- On April 29, 2013 Diebold disclosed his stroke during a DOT periodic exam and his DOT medical examiner certificate (MEC) was not reissued; DOT guidance recommends a one-year waiting period after stroke for commercial drivers.
- UPS Freight (UPSF) policy required a valid MEC for road-driver duties; UPSF interpreted the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) to allow dock work for employees with suspended/revoked CDLs (e.g., DUI) but not for employees medically disqualified.
- Diebold was denied full-time dock work starting May 13, 2013; he complained and UPSF opened its ADA process, which concluded he "may be a Qualified Individual" and in December 2013 offered a lower‑paid part‑time (casual) dock position that Diebold rejected.
- Diebold obtained a valid MEC on December 31, 2013 and returned to the road-driver position January 5, 2014; he later voluntarily retired in 2015. EEOC sued for disability discrimination under the ADAAA.
- The district court denied both parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, finding triable issues whether Diebold had a record of disability or was regarded as disabled and whether UPSF’s actions were because of that disability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Diebold was "disabled" under the ADAAA (record of or regarded as) | Diebold had a record of impairment from the January 2013 stroke and UPSF regarded him as impaired due to the MEC restriction | Diebold was not disabled at the time of the adverse acts; UPSF acted based on lack of MEC, not disability | Court: stroke was an impairment and raised recurrence risk, but there are genuine disputes whether it substantially limited major life activities and whether UPSF perceived a non‑transitory/minor impairment—summary judgment denied |
| Whether Diebold was a "qualified individual" for the dock job | Diebold could perform the essential functions of dock work with or without accommodation | UPSF focuses on lack of MEC for the road-driver job (not dock job) | Court: as to the full-time dock position Diebold was a qualified individual as a matter of law |
| Causation — whether UPSF’s differential application of the CBA was because of disability | UPSF treated medically disqualified drivers differently than employees with DUI, so actions were based on disability/its perception | UPSF acted because Diebold lacked a MEC (a medical/regulatory disqualification), not because of disability | Court: material fact question whether lack of MEC was treated as part of/connected to Diebold’s impairment; summary judgment denied |
| Procedural sufficiency of EEOC’s summary judgment filing | EEOC’s incorporation-by-reference of its response preserved its arguments on disability | UPSF argued EEOC failed properly to move on disability element | Court: EEOC’s cross-reference was adequate; court considered both parties’ submissions |
Key Cases Cited
- Adair v. City of Muskogee, 823 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2016) (elements for a "regarded as" disability claim)
- Hawkins v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 778 F.3d 877 (10th Cir. 2015) (direct-evidence/discrimination analysis and applicability of McDonnell Douglas)
- Carter v. Pathfinder Energy Servs., Inc., 662 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2011) (prima facie requirements and substantial‑limitation analysis)
- Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (reassignment doctrine: qualified for a different position satisfies qualification element)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment burden‑shifting principles)
- EEOC v. STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2019) (employer must have perceived a current existing impairment at the time of alleged discrimination)