197 Conn.App. 31
Conn. App. Ct.2020Background
- Plaintiff obtained judgment of strict foreclosure (2012) and law days were repeatedly reset due to successive bankruptcy filings by various parties.
- Wellsville Properties, LLC (Wellsville) and co-owner Pastor filed three chapter 7 petitions; the first two were dismissed before title passed; a third was filed shortly before the February 20, 2018 law days.
- Plaintiff moved for orders asserting no automatic stay applied (invoking 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i) and arguing § 49-15(b) did not apply to Wellsville); the court granted those motions on March 12, 2018. Defendants did not object to those motions at the time.
- Under governing federal precedent, a bankruptcy filing after judgment but before law day extends redemption only 60 days under 11 U.S.C. § 108(b); here the extended law days expired without redemption, vesting absolute title in plaintiff in April 2018.
- Defendants filed motions to reargue in December 2018 (about eight months after title vested); the trial court denied them as untimely. On appeal, the court held the motions were moot and should have been dismissed rather than denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness/denial of motions to reargue | Motions filed long after title vested; denial proper as untimely | Motions raised legal errors and should have been considered despite delay | Court: motions were moot because title had vested; should have been dismissed, not denied |
| Applicability of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-15(b) (automatic opening on mortgagor bankruptcy) | § 49-15(b) does not apply because Wellsville is not the mortgagor (Mamudi was) | § 49-15(b) automatically vacates law days on bankruptcy filing | Held § 49-15(b) inapplicable—mortgagor was Mamudi, not Wellsville |
| Effect of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (automatic stay) after multiple dismissals | No automatic stay automatically reinstated under § 362(c)(4) because prior dismissals prevent an automatic stay on a later filing | Defendants asserted filing invoked an automatic stay that indefinitely paused law days | Court: § 362(c)(4)(A)(i) (as applied with facts) and lack of objection meant no indefinite stay blocked law days |
| Effect of 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) on law days | § 108(b) extends redemption only 60 days after order for relief; law days ran after that extension and title vested | § 108(b) should have preserved or further extended law days, depriving defendants of appeal window | Court: § 108(b) applies to extend redemption 60 days; defendants failed to redeem during extension and title vested, so no practical relief on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Provident Bank v. Lewitt, 84 Conn. App. 204 (Conn. App. 2004) (applies 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) to extend redemption only 60 days when bankruptcy filed after foreclosure judgment)
- In re Canney, 284 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2002) (Second Circuit reasoned § 108(b), not § 362(a), governs timing when bankruptcy follows a foreclosure judgment)
- Seminole Realty, LLC v. Sekretaev, 192 Conn. App. 405 (Conn. App. 2019) (applies Provident Bank reasoning; § 108(b) 60‑day extension leads to vesting when redemption not made)
- Sovereign Bank v. Licata, 178 Conn. App. 82 (Conn. App. 2017) (explains that once law days pass and title vests, appellate courts cannot grant practical relief)
- Barclays Bank of New York v. Ivler, 20 Conn. App. 163 (Conn. App. 1989) (establishes that if law days have run and equity of redemption is extinguished, appeals provide no practical relief)